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INTRODUCTION 
This Comment describes one approach to securing public access to the 
data collected by police-worn body cameras (PWBC). Ever since the rapid 
expansion of body camera programs following highly publicized police 
shootings (particularly the shooting of Michael Brown in Ferguson, Missouri, 
in the summer of 2014), state legislatures across the country have rushed to 
decide who should have access to the collected video and how to limit its 
public release.1 Over half of the major police departments across the country 
are using body cameras supplied by a single manufacturer alone, and the 
 
1 See Mary D. Fan, Privacy, Public Disclosure, Police Body Cameras: Policy Splits, 68 ALA. L. 
REV. 395, 407-09 (2016) (comparing survey results which showed less than a quarter of police 
departments used body cameras in the summer of 2013 while ninety-five percent of departments 
surveyed in 2015 have committed to using body cameras, and attributing the change to the 
aftermath of Brown’s shooting); see also Ryan J. Foley, State Bills Would Limit Access to Police Body 
Cam Videos, POLICEONE.COM (Mar. 24, 2015), https://www.policeone.com/police-products/body-
cameras/articles/8481000-State-bills-would-limit-access-to-police-body-cam-videos/ 
[https://perma.cc/J6JD-N6EN] (“State legislators around the country are pushing to make it much 
harder for the public to obtain police officer body camera videos, undermining their promise as a 
tool people can use to hold law enforcement accountable.”); Elizabeth Joh, Free Police Body Cameras 
Come with a Price, SLATE (Apr. 5, 2017), http://www.slate.com/blogs/future_tense/2017/04/
05/taser_international_now_axon_offers_police_free_body_cameras.html?wpsrc=sh_all_tab_fb_ru 
[https://perma.cc/X98K-VQ53] (“Regulations about how, when, and whether to use [body cameras] 
vary widely by jurisdiction.”); Laurel Wamsley, Taser Changes Its Name to Axon and Offers Free Body 
Cameras for Police, NPR (Apr. 7, 2017, 4:21 PM), http://www.npr.org/sections/thetwo-way/2017/
04/07/522878573/we-re-more-than-stun-guns-says-taser-as-it-changes-company-name?utm_source=
facebook.com&utm_medium=social&utm_campaign=npr&utm_term=nprnews&utm_content=
20170408 [https://perma.cc/KFV9-4NQ3] (“Sales of body cameras have boomed since the national uproar 
over a number of police-involved shootings, including the 2014 shooting of Michael Brown in Ferguson, Mo.”). 
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storage and release of the video is an urgent issue.2 The patchwork of laws 
governing the disclosure of PWBC data has left the public without simple or 
consistent means of accessing that information.3 
Every state except New Hampshire exempts police records from public 
records requests.4 Many laws which explicitly address the release of PWBC data 
either grant disclosure discretion to a custodian5 or a judge,6 or they prohibit 
release entirely, absent special circumstances.7 The myriad restrictions on public 
access has stymied the avowed purpose of implementing body camera programs: 
to increase the transparency and public accountability of police practices.8 
The goal of fostering transparency to improve community relations would 
be more easily achieved if local governments and police departments, in the 
exercise of their discretion over local affairs, could publicly release video of 
 
2 See Wamsley, supra note 1 (“[Taser International, now Axon] says its cameras are now used by 
36 of the 68 major law enforcement agencies across America, including the Los Angeles Police 
Department, which bought more than 7,500 of the devices.”); id. (“Officers are increasingly getting 
used to recording their interactions with the public, and now a key question is what police 
departments should do with all that footage.”). 
3 Because “[t]he decision whether or not to release the recordings is usually left to the 
legislatures rather than the police departments,” each state governs access in a unique way. Richard 
Shiller, Shooting in High Definition: How Having Tough Policies in Place Makes the Use of Body Cameras 
in Law Enforcement Comport with the Fourth Amendment, 51 NEW ENG. L. REV. 187, 205 (2016); see 
also Fan, supra note 1, at 401 (noting many states have had “competing bills tangled in fierce disputes 
over how to best balance transparency with privacy and how to protect the public”). 
4 Police Body-Worn Camera Legislation Tracker: State by State Breakdown, URBAN INST. (Jan. 1, 2017), 
http://apps-staging.urban.org/features/body-camera-update/ [https://perma.cc/55K9-9RBW]. 
5 See, e.g., N.C. GEN. STAT. § 132-1.4A(d) (2016) (denying police agencies the ability to publicly 
release PWBC body camera video and limiting disclosure of a recording to a person in the recording or 
such a person’s representative at the discretion of the custodial law enforcement agency). 
6 See, e.g., LA. STAT. ANN. § 44:3(A)(8)(b) (2017) (“Body-worn camera video or audio 
recordings that are determined by the custodian to violate an individual’s reasonable expectation of 
privacy shall be disclosed upon a determination and order from a court of competent jurisdiction.”). 
7 See, e.g., CAL. PENAL CODE § 832.18(b)(8) (2017) (prohibiting police personnel from 
uploading video records to public websites); MO. REV. STAT. § 610.100.2(2) (2016) (“[M]obile video 
recordings and investigative reports of all law enforcement agencies are closed records until the 
investigation becomes inactive.”). A Pennsylvania bill that was defeated in 2016, and is likely to be 
reintroduced, would have required body camera footage to be “withheld under the state’s Right-To-
Know Law if an agency made the decision that the footage was part of an ongoing investigation.” 
Matt Stroud, Will Pennsylvania Make Police Body Camera Footage Impossible to Obtain?, ACLU (Jan. 27, 
2017), https://medium.com/@ACLUPA/will-pennsylvania-make-police-body-camera-footage-impos
sible-to-obtain-8a27fe5f99d9 [https://perma.cc/9AQX-55H9]. 
8 See Chuck Wexler, Letter from the PERF Executive Director, in POLICE EXEC. RESEARCH FORUM, 
IMPLEMENTING A BODY-WORN CAMERA PROGRAM, at v (2014) (“A police department that deploys 
body-worn cameras is making a statement that it believes the actions of its officers are a matter of public 
record.”); see also Fan, supra note 1, at 399 (arguing body cameras are endorsed by law enforcement officers 
because “recording encounters can help rebuild public trust, improve public as well as officer behavior, and 
protect against false complaints”); Matt Stroud, Yes, Body Cameras ARE Designed to Monitor Police, ACLU 
(Mar. 9, 2017), https://medium.com/@ACLUPA/yes-body-cameras-are-designed-to-monitor-police-
9c6c9303e086#.rdmiu9z5l [https://perma.cc/5CP4-CXGT] (“[H]igh-ranking police leaders agreed that 
body cameras would help to build trust between officers and the communities they serve.”). 
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contested police encounters without prior restraint.9 Some police departments 
seek to do just that, either in situations of suspected unwarranted police 
violence or matters of national importance.10 For example, in October of 2017 
the Las Vegas Police Department publicly released a compilation of PWBC 
footage only two days after the worst mass shooting in U.S. history took place.11 
Localities may seek to do so when it would improve community relations, 
inform public debate of police practices, and educate residents so they can 
effectively participate in the process of self-government. However, state 
statutes may prevent localities from securing these benefits for their citizens. 
In this Comment, I argue that state laws which restrict disclosure of 
PWBC data by municipal governments run afoul of the First Amendment’s 
Free Speech Clause and are subject to constitutional challenge by the 
municipalities themselves. Part I challenges the nearly century-old doctrine 
that local governments lack the power to bring constitutional claims against 
their own state, concluding both that the doctrine lacks consistency and that 
it has not been, nor should be, applied to a free speech claim. Part II examines 
how the Supreme Court has treated speech by government entities under the 
First Amendment, concluding the question of protection for such speech, 
which could serve as the foundation for a constitutional claim by 
municipalities and police departments against state statutes which restrict the 
 
9 See Fan, supra note 1, at 414 (“The power of body cameras to prevent and provide 
accountability for [police shooting] deaths is seriously stunted by the inability of the public to get 
such video [and] leaving release to the discretion of law enforcement.”). 
10 See, e.g., Victoria Cavaliere, Seattle Police Begin Posting Body Camera Footage on YouTube 
Channel, REUTERS (Feb. 26, 2015), http://www.reuters.com/article/2015/02/26/us-usa-police-seattle-
idUSKBN0LU2C220150226 [http://perma.cc/8MUV-W6S6] (reporting that the Seattle Police 
Department launched a YouTube channel in 2015 to allow the public to view video from body 
cameras “as part of a pilot program to increase transparency”). It should be noted that video 
uploaded to this channel has been stripped of audio and is heavily blurred. However, private users 
who have successfully requested PWBC video have posted unredacted versions. See also Kate 
Mather, Study Finds Broad Public, Police Support for Release of LAPD Shooting Video, but Sharp Split 
Over Timing, L.A. TIMES, (Sept. 26, 2017), http://www.latimes.com/local/lanow/la-me-ln-lapd-
video-policy-20170926-story.html [https://perma.cc/G2TZ-B4HY] (forecasting that the LAPD 
Police Commission, a civilian panel that sets the department’s policies, may decide to make PWBC 
video automatically public due to vast public support for the release of video); Cleve R. Wootson 
Jr., A Body Cam Captured a Cop’s Violent Encounter with a Teen—But a New Law Keeps the Video Secret, 
WASH. POST (Apr. 6, 2017), https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/post-nation/wp/2017/04/06/a-
body-cam-captured-a-cops-violent-encounter-with-a-teen-but-a-new-law-keeps-the-video-
secret/?utm_term=.18949cf77dd9 [https://perma.cc/W3MM-G87J] (noting that in North Carolina, 
the city council released PWBC video of two violent incidents between police officers and 
community members before a state law restricting such release took effect). 
11 See Emily Shapiro & Karma Allen, Chaos of Law Vegas Massacre Seen in Newly Released Police 
Bodycam Footage, ABC NEWS (Oct. 4, 2017), http://www.abcnews.go.com/US/las-vegas-
massacre/story?id=50246458 [https://perma.cc/SXH9-GSA3] (showing the chaos that erupted after 
a gunman opened fire at a music festival). 
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release of PWBC data, remains an open question. Part III argues for the 
protection of government speech under the First Amendment, suggesting 
that there are strong jurisprudential and policy arguments for extending 
protection to government speech, particularly when the government speaker 
is a municipal entity. Part IV assumes that government speech is protected 
under the First Amendment and examines whether a local government entity 
could bring a free speech challenge against its creating state. Part V offers a 
broad-strokes analysis of such a hypothetical First Amendment free speech 
claim by a municipality, assuming restraints on PWBC data disclosures are 
content-based prior restraints on speech subject to strict scrutiny. Part VI 
examines, as an alternative to a claim by a protected government speaker, a 
public “right to know” claim by a local government plaintiff against state 
restrictions on releasing PWBC data consistent with the Court’s decisions on 
local government powerlessness to bring constitutional claims of its own. 
I. CONSTITUTIONAL CLAIMS BY CITIES AGAINST THEIR STATE 
State laws restricting the release of PWBC data bind local officials. For a 
municipality to challenge such laws under the First Amendment Free Speech 
Clause, it must be able to state a claim against its creating state. The common 
legal wisdom is that municipalities, as creations of the state, have no rights 
which they can assert against their creator.12 In this Part, I first analyze the 
cases that form the foundation of this majority rule. Second, I examine cases 
which have permitted municipalities, despite this majority rule, to raise 
constitutional claims against their creating states. Third, I argue that the rule 
is not grounded in doctrines of standing or capacity, but rather is limited to 
substantive constitutional provisions. Finally, I argue that the First Amendment 
is not a provision to which the rule has been, or should be, applied. 
 
12 See Hunter v. City of Pittsburgh, 207 U.S. 161, 178-79 (1907) (“The number, nature, and 
duration of the powers conferred upon [municipal] corporations . . . rests in the absolute discretion 
of the state . . . unrestrained by any provision of the Constitution of the United States.”); Note, The 
Constitutionality of Municipal Advocacy in Statewide Referendum Campaigns, 93 HARV. L. REV. 535, 536 
(1980) (“[T]he central tenet of local government law: municipalities are creatures of the state. That 
principle limits a municipality’s powers to those either expressly granted by the state constitution 
or a state statute or those necessarily implied in any expressly conferred powers.”); Eugene Volokh, 
Do State and Local Governments Have Free Speech Rights?, WASH. POST, (Jun. 24, 2015), 
https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/volokh-conspiracy/wp/2015/06/24/do-state-and-local-gove
rnments-have-free-speech-rights/?utm_term=.d9a0beb7655c [https://perma.cc/X95T-RD6W] 
(noting that “local governments and state agencies likely have no First Amendment rights against 
state governments, because the state is entitled to control the conduct of its subdivisions”). 
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A. The Common Wisdom of Political Subdivisions 
The oft-quoted rule of local government law is that municipalities are 
state creations without rights beyond those given to them by the state and 
that the state may take away those rights at its convenience.13 This common 
legal wisdom stems from the Court’s dicta in Hunter v. City of Pittsburgh,14 
wherein it noted that the state “may do as it will, unrestrained by any 
provision of the Constitution of the United States” with regard to its political 
subdivisions.15 Hunter addressed whether citizens of Allegheny County could 
challenge Pennsylvania’s decision to merge the cities of Allegheny and 
Pittsburgh over their objection.16 The citizen plaintiffs argued that the state’s 
combination of the two cities deprived them of due process of law by 
“subjecting [them] to the burden of the additional taxation which would result 
from the consolidation.”17 Rejecting this argument, the Court held the citizens 
had no right to the continued existence of their municipal corporation because: 
Municipal corporations are political subdivisions of the state, created as 
convenient agencies for exercising such of the governmental powers of the State 
as may be intrusted [sic] to them . . . . [T]he powers conferred upon these 
corporations and the territory over which they shall be exercised rests in the 
absolute discretion of the State . . . . [T]heir charters [do not] . . . constitute[] 
a contract with the State within the meaning of the Federal Constitution. The 
State, therefore, at its pleasure may modify or withdraw all such powers . . . 
with or without the consent of the citizens . . . . [T]he State is supreme, and its 
legislative body, conforming its action to the state constitution, may do as it 
will, unrestrained by any provision of the Constitution of the United States.18 
Hunter thus spawned a doctrine of local powerlessness which has 
characterized the municipal corporation as “merely a department of the 
 
13 See Hunter, 207 U.S. at 178 (“Municipal corporations are political subdivisions of the State, 
created as convenient agencies for exercising such of the governmental powers of the state as may 
be intrusted [sic] to them.”); Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U.S. 533, 575 (1964) (“Political subdivisions of 
States—counties, cities, or whatever . . . have been traditionally regarded as subordinate 
governmental instrumentalities created by the State to assist in the carrying out of state 
governmental functions.”); Mark G. Yudof, When Governments Speak: Toward a Theory of Government 
Expression and the First Amendment, 57 TEX. L. REV. 863, 870 (1979) (“While differences in degree 
may exist, local governments are as much creatures of the state as federal administrative agencies 
are creatures of Congress.”). 
14 207 U.S. 161. 
15 Id. at 179. 
16 See Kathleen S. Morris, The Case for Local Constitutional Enforcement, 47 HARV. C.R.-C.L. 
L. REV. 1, 15 (2012) (“Hunter considered whether the residents of one locality could challenge their 
state’s decision to shift local boundaries and thereby merge them with another locality.”) 
17 Hunter, 207 U.S. at 177. 
18 Id. at 178-79. 
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State”19 without independent constitutional status. In the following decades, 
the Court employed this doctrine to bar constitutional arguments by 
municipalities under the Takings and Contracts Clauses,20 and the Due 
Process21 and Equal Protection22 Clauses of the Fourteenth Amendment. The 
language of these cases has been cited by the Court sporadically since the 
early twentieth century without further analysis or indeed any explanation 
for the general proposition that a municipal entity cannot invoke constitutional 
provisions against the actions of its creating state.23 Many lower courts have 
latched onto this broad doctrine to completely bar constitutional claims and 
defenses by municipalities asserted against acts of their states.24 
B. Hunter’s Shadow Doctrine 
Despite its sweeping rhetoric, Hunter itself has not been applied by the 
Court to bar a municipality’s constitutional challenge to a state law since 
Williams v. Baltimore was decided in 1933.25 Its broad principle has never been 
critically examined by the Court,26 despite being deployed inconsistently 
since that time to bar municipal claims.27 Dissenting Justices have at times 
 
19 City of Trenton v. New Jersey, 262 U.S. 182, 187 (1923). 
20 See, e.g., id. at 188 (denying the city’s Takings Clause claim that it could require the state to 
grant it the same exception to a license fee that it had granted to a private water company the city 
had purchased); City of Newark v. New Jersey, 262 U.S. 192, 196 (1923) (denying the city’s Equal 
Protection Clause claim under the same facts and rationale as in the companion case City of Trenton). 
21 See, e.g., Holt Civic Club v. City of Tuscaloosa, 439 U.S. 60, 75 (1978) (denying a claim by 
citizen plaintiffs that extending police jurisdiction over their residence outside of town without also 
extending the voting district violated the Due Process Clause). 
22 See, e.g., Williams v. Mayor of Baltimore, 289 U.S. 36, 40 (1933) (overturning a circuit court 
ruling that a state law exempting a railroad corporation from local taxes violated the Equal 
Protection Clause as to plaintiff municipalities). 
23 See Josh Bendor, Municipal Constitutional Rights: A New Approach, 31 YALE L. & POL’Y REV. 
389, 391 (2013) (“Aside from Gomillion [v. Lightfoot, 364 U.S. 339 (1960)], there has been almost no 
meaningful analysis of the Hunter doctrine in decades.”). 
24 See, e.g., Herriman v. Bell, 590 F.3d 1176, 1183 (10th Cir. 2010) (denying the plaintiff city 
standing to bring a Fourteenth Amendment Equal Protection claim); Palomar Pomerado Health 
Sys. v. Belshe, 180 F.3d 1104, 1107-08 (9th Cir. 1999) (denying plaintiff health care district standing 
to sue its creating state under the federal Constitution because it was a political subdivision); Texas 
Catastrophe Prop. Ins. Ass’n v. Morales, 975 F.2d 1178, 1180 (5th Cir. 1992) (deciding that if the 
plaintiff agency had been considered part of the state, it could not assert a constitutional right to 
retained counsel); City of New York v. Richardson, 473 F.2d 923, 929 (2d Cir. 1973) (noting that 
while the Hunter doctrine’s validity has been questioned, it “remains controlling authority”). 
25 See Morris, supra note 16, at 16-17 (“Indeed, in the seventy-eight years since Williams, the Court 
has not invoked the Hunter doctrine to bar a single local constitutional challenge to state action.”). 
26 See Bendor, supra note 23. 
27 Compare Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U.S. 533, 575 (1964) (distinguishing a plan for state legislative 
apportionment from local representative apportionment by briefly referencing Hunter’s principle 
that states have “absolute discretion” over the powers of their political subdivisions in a way 
dissimilar to their relationship to the federal government), with Bd. of Educ. v. Allen, 392 U.S. 236, 
238 (1968), questioned in Charlestown v. United States, 696 F. Supp. 800, 809-11 (D.R.I. 
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noted the oversimplified nature of the doctrine and the doctrinal thicket in the 
lower courts which is the result of its scattershot application.28 For their part, 
legal scholars view the Hunter doctrine as “analytically muddled”29 and in need 
of an overhaul.30 Lower courts have recognized its force as “waning with time.”31 
In recognition of the doctrine’s odd disappearing act, the Court has noted 
Hunter is not the absolute bar its dicta claims it to be in cases like Gomillion 
v. Lightfoot.32 In Gomillion, the Court considered a city’s Fifteenth Amendment 
challenge to a state gerrymander of its borders.33 In rejecting the state’s 
invocation of Hunter’s assertion that it can shape its political subdivisions at 
its absolute discretion, the Court declared “[we have] never acknowledged 
that the States have power to do as they will with municipal corporations 
regardless of consequences. Legislative control of municipalities, no less than 
other state power, lies within the scope of relevant limitations imposed by the 
United States Constitution.”34 Some scholars read this language in Gomillion 
to mean, at its narrowest, that municipalities may sue their state when a 
manifestation of state control over the municipality violates the rights of the 
 
1988) (considering a school board’s First Amendment Establishment Clause challenge to state 
mandated expenditures on the merits). 
28 See City of South Lake Tahoe v. Cal. Tahoe Reg’l Planning Agency, 449 U.S. 1039, 1042 
(1980) (White, J., dissenting from denial of certiorari) (“Such a per se rule [barring a political 
subdivision’s standing to make constitutional objections to its state’s statutes] is inconsistent with 
[Board of Education v.] Allen [392 U.S. 236 (1968)], in which one of the appellants was a local board 
of education. Furthermore, there is a conflict in the Circuits over the validity of such a rule.”); see 
also Ysursa v. Pocatello Educ. Ass’n, 555 U.S. 353, 375 (2009) (Stevens, J., dissenting) (“Relationships 
between state and local governments are more varied, and the consequences of that variation are 
more significant, than the majority’s analysis admits.”). 
29 Morris, supra note 16, at 5. 
30 See David J. Barron, Why (and When) Cities Have a Stake in Enforcing the Constitution, 115 
YALE L.J. 2218, 2223 (2006) (arguing to permit municipal constitutional challenges to state laws 
when local political self-determination is implicated); Joan Williams, The Constitutional Vulnerability 
of American Local Government: The Politics of City Status in American Law, 1 WIS. L. REV. 83, 86 
(1986) (stating municipal legal status is a “startlingly pure example of politics as black letter law”); 
Morris, supra note 16, at 26 (calling for overruling Hunter on Erie grounds); Bendor, supra note 23, 
at 397 (arguing Hunter is a substantive law ruling which permits municipalities to claim some limited 
constitutional rights against their states). 
31  Amato v. Wilentz, 952 F.2d 742, 755 (3d Cir. 1991). 
32 364 U.S. 339, 342 (1960); see also Holt Civic Club v. City of Tuscaloosa, 439 U.S. 60, 71 (1978) 
(“[T]he broad statements as to state control over municipal corporations contained in Hunter have 
undoubtedly been qualified by the holdings of later cases such as Kramer v. Union Free School Dist.”). 
33 Gomillion v. Lightfoot, 364 U.S. 339, 340 (1960). 
34 Id. at 344-45. 
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citizenry.35 It clearly provides that some constitutional provisions limit state 
control of municipalities, despite Hunter’s rhetoric.36 
Despite these periodic rejections in specific substantive constitutional 
contexts, the Court has not offered a comprehensive rationale explaining what 
circumstances entail the doctrine’s application or absence. This lack of a 
roadmap has left the status of municipalities the subject of great confusion 
among scholars, which is best summarized by Kathleen Morris’s observation 
that “[t]hey are components of state governments except when they are not 
(but we do not know when or why), and they can bring constitutional claims 
except when they cannot (but we do not know when or why).”37 
Many municipal plaintiffs have had their claims decided on the merits, 
much as they did before Hunter was handed down.38 This line of cases rarely, 
if ever, mentions Hunter, instead departing from its doctrine sub silentio to 
treat municipalities as legally and constitutionally cognizable entities.39 These 
cases frequently arise under specific constitutional provisions. Federal Equal 
Protection claims have been brought by municipal plaintiffs to challenge state 
laws “restricting local efforts to combat private discrimination,”40 apparently 
 
35 See David J. Barron, The Promise of Cooley’s City: Traces of Local Constitutionalism, 147 U. PA. 
L. REV. 487, 568 (1999) (“These cases do not, however, support the further proposition that local 
governments are entitled to a degree of constitutional protection from an exercise of state power 
that would not interfere with a judicially enforceable individual constitutional right. Rather, the 
cases show that a state may not justify the infringement of an otherwise judicially enforceable 
individual constitutional right simply by asserting its power to control its local governments.”). The 
Court confirmed the basis for this interpretation when it revisited Gomillion in Baker v. Carr, saying 
“Gomillion was lifted ‘out of the so-called “political” arena and into the conventional sphere of 
constitutional litigation’ because here was discriminatory treatment of a racial minority violating the 
Fifteenth Amendment.” 369 U.S. 186, 230 (1962). 
36 See Baker, 369 U.S. at 229 (citing Hunter when stating Gomillion explicitly rejected “what a 
majority of the Court of Appeals thought to be a sweeping commitment to state legislatures of the 
power to draw and redraw such boundaries”); Michael A. Lawrence, Do “Creatures of the State” Have 
Constitutional Rights?: Standing for Municipalities to Assert Procedural Due Process Claims Against the 
State, 47 VILL. L. REV. 93, 101 (2002) (“Gomillion thus sets forth the important principle that there 
are constitutional limits to the degree of control that may be asserted by a state over municipal 
corporations, through legislation or otherwise.”). 
37 Morris, supra note 16, at 44. 
38 See, e.g., Bd. of Comm’rs of Tippecanoe County v. Lucas, 93 U.S. 108, 115 (1876) (suggesting 
a locality could invoke the Constitution against its state in some limited circumstances, such as to 
protect county property just as individual and private corporations’ property was). 
39 See Morris, supra note 16, at 3 n.5 (“Scholars refer to these cases as the ‘shadow doctrine’ of 
local government law . . . [wherein t]he Court has treated localities as independent from their states 
for purposes of liability for judgments, the ability to collect on federal grant obligations, Eleventh 
Amendment immunity, the Sherman Act, school desegregation, and voting rights.”). 
40 Barron, supra note 30, at 2243-44 n.94; see, e.g., Romer v. Evans, 517 U.S. 620, 623-24 (1996) 
(invalidating under the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment a state law 
prohibiting localities from barring discrimination on the basis of sexual orientation); Papasan v. 
Allain, 478 U.S. 265, 275 (1986) (remanding school officials’ Equal Protection Clause challenges to 
state for consideration on the merits); Washington v. Seattle Sch. Dist. No. 1, 458 U.S. 457, 467-70 
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overruling City of Newark, which held that municipalities could not invoke 
the Fourteenth Amendment in opposition to their creator.41 Municipalities 
have also had claims considered on the merits under the Supremacy Clause,42 
the Contracts Clause,43 and the First Amendment Establishment Clause.44 
Additionally, the Court has denied cert in several cases wherein lower courts 
have permitted municipalities to bring suit against the state,45 indicating 
approval for the abrogation of Hunter’s doctrine.46 
The breadth of constitutional provisions under which municipalities have 
been permitted to raise claims against their state casts doubt on David 
Barron’s argument that only infringement of individual constitutional rights 
avoids Hunter’s bar against political subdivision challenges.47 For instance, the 
Supremacy and Contracts Clauses are structural provisions rather than 
provisions enshrining individual rights. That the Court has reached 
municipal claims under these provisions on the merits suggests that, in 
addition to violations of individual rights, violations of the city’s own rights 
can be the basis for a municipal claim against its state. 
 
(1982) (considering on the merits a school district’s Equal Protection Clause challenge to a state 
statute); San Antonio Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1, 5 n.2 (1973) (allowing a school 
district to intervene in an Equal Protection Clause challenge to the state’s school finance 
scheme); City of Chi. v. Sturges, 222 U.S. 313, 324 (1911) (ruling that a state requiring cities to pay 
for mob riot damage did not violate the Equal Protection or Due Process Clauses). 
41 See City of Newark v. New Jersey, 262 U.S. 192, 196 (1923) (“The City cannot invoke the 
protection of the Fourteenth Amendment against the State.”). 
42 See, e.g., Nixon v. Mo. Mun. League, 541 U.S. 125, 131, 133-34 (2004) (considering on the merits 
whether a state may prohibit a municipality from providing telecommunications services); Lawrence Cnty. v. 
Lead-Deadwood Sch. Dist. No. 40-1, 469 U.S. 256, 257-58 (1985) (invalidating a state statute on Supremacy 
Clause grounds which required localities to disburse federal payments in lieu of taxes to school districts). 
43 See, e.g., City of Bos. v. Jackson, 260 U.S. 309, 314-16 (1922) (rejecting, seemingly on the 
merits, a city’s Contracts Clause and Due Process Clause arguments against requiring it to levy taxes 
and turn them over to the state); City of Pawhuska v. Pawhuska Oil & Gas Co., 250 U.S. 394, 395, 
399 (1919) (rejecting, in part on the merits, municipal plaintiff ’s Contracts Clause challenge to a 
state order regulating a gas company servicing the city). 
44 See Bd. of Educ. v. Allen, 392 U.S. 236, 238 (1968) (rejecting on the merits a school district’s 
Establishment Clause challenge to a state law requiring it to purchase textbooks for students 
attending parochial schools). 
45 See, e.g., United States v. Alabama, 791 F.2d 1450, 1455 (11th Cir. 1986), cert. denied, 479 U.S. 
1085 (1987) (interpreting Gomillion as limiting Hunter’s bar on city suits to its substantive provision); 
San Diego Unified Port Dist. v. Gianturco, 651 F.2d 1306, 1309-12, 1319 (9th Cir. 1981), cert. denied, 455 
U.S. 1000 (1982) (finding state regulation of the plaintiff local port district was unconstitutional under 
the Supremacy Clause); Rogers v. Brockette, 588 F.2d 1057, 1067-71 (5th Cir. 1979), cert. denied, 444 
U.S. 827 (1979) (holding that Gomillion limited Hunter to its substantive provision and cities are only 
barred from suing their state when it would “interfere with a state’s internal political organization”). 
46 In City of Charleston v. Public Service Comm’n, the Fourth Circuit expressed doubts based on 
these denials of cert that “the ‘broad dicta’ that ‘a political subdivision may never sue its maker on 
constitutional grounds’ is really ‘the rule.’” 57 F.3d 385, 390 (4th Cir. 1995). 
47 See Barron, supra note 30, at 2221-22. 
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C. Hunter as a Decision of Standing or Capacity 
While the Hunter Court charged lower courts to apply its doctrine 
wherever applicable,48 the doctrine’s ambiguous nature and lack of an explicit 
unifying rule of application has led lower courts to interpret and apply it in 
disparate ways. Some view it as a rule of standing,49 others as a decision about 
a municipality’s capacity to bring suit,50 and still others as a rule of substantive 
constitutional law confined to the provisions it dealt with.51 
The doctrinal footing upon which Hunter’s “seemingly unconfined dicta”52 sits 
is determinative of its scope and effect. Thus, this Section examines each possible 
foundation and concludes, based on Gomillion and the pattern of application under 
specific constitutional provisions, that Hunter is a rule of substantive constitutional 
law which leaves open the possibility that a municipality may raise a First 
Amendment free speech challenge against its creating state. 
Hunter is not a doctrine of standing for five main reasons. First, the term 
“standing” today does not mean what it did when cases like Williams 
employed it. Second, cities can have standing against their creating state 
when the state violates the rights of the city’s residents. Third, Hunter has 
blocked arguments by defendant municipalities. Fourth, the Supreme Court 
has affirmed state cases decided on Hunter grounds. Finally, Hunter has been 
employed to dismiss claims by private plaintiffs. The Ninth and Tenth 
Circuits, which interpret Hunter to be a decision about standing, appear to do 
so because the Court described the Hunter doctrine in terms of standing in 
 
48 Hunter v. City of Pittsburgh, 207 U.S. 161, 178 (1907) (describing the powerlessness of political 
subdivisions as “settled doctrines of this court, to be acted upon wherever they are applicable”). 
49 The Ninth and Tenth Circuits consider Hunter to be a decision about the standing of 
political subdivisions. See, e.g., City of Herriman v. Bell, 590 F.3d 1176, 1183 (10th Cir. 2010) 
(“Herriman City thus lacks . . . independent standing . . . to bring this Fourteenth Amendment 
equal protection claim.”); Palomar Pomerado Health Sys. v. Belshe, 180 F.3d 1104, 1107 (9th Cir. 
1999) (dismissing for lack of standing because “a political subdivision of the state, has no standing 
to sue the state in federal court”); Burbank-Glendale-Pasadena Airport Auth. v. City of Burbank, 
136 F.3d 1360, 1363 (9th Cir. 1998) (recognizing that “there is a general rule against standing on the 
part of a state subdivision to contest state statutes”); City of Moore v. Atchison, Topeka, & Santa 
Fe Ry. Co., 699 F.2d 507, 511-12 (10th Cir. 1983) (“[P]olitical subdivisions of a state lack standing to 
challenge the validity of a state statute on Fourteenth Amendment grounds.”). 
50 The Fifth Circuit apparently interprets Hunter to address the nature of a political 
subdivision, whether it be a city or an agency of the state. See Texas Catastrophe Prop. Ins. Ass’n v. 
Morales, 975 F.2d 1178, 1181 (5th Cir. 1992) (“A state agency has no constitutional rights to assert 
against the state of which it is a part.”) 
51 The Second Circuit considers Hunter to be a decision of substantive constitutional law. See 
City of New York v. Richardson, 473 F.2d 923, 929 (2d Cir. 1973) (“Political subdivisions of a state 
may not challenge the validity of a state statute under the Fourteenth Amendment.”); Shirk v. City 
of Lancaster, 169 A. 557, 560 (Pa. 1933) (“[R]evenues derived in [a municipal corporation’s] private 
capacity, as a return from its water or other utility works, are trust funds, and cannot be controlled 
or taken directly for state purposes.”). 
52 Gomillion v. Lightfoot, 364 U.S. 339, 344 (1960). 
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cases like Williams and Coleman v. Miller.53 Because the Constitution has little 
to say about the standing of municipalities, “judges have stepped into the 
breach by drawing on general constitutional principles.”54 Some circuit court 
judges have tried to fill that breach with Hunter in error. 
When Williams and Coleman were decided in 193355 and 1939,56 
respectively, the term “standing” meant something very different than it does 
after Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife defined the doctrine in 1992.57 In Rogers v. 
Brockette, the Fifth Circuit explained that standing simply meant that the 
constitutional or statutory provision at issue protected the party’s interests 
rather than being the “threshold question”58 it is today. While the Fifth 
Circuit indicated support for considering Hunter to be a rule of prudential 
standing, Kathleen Morris argues persuasively against that reading.59 
Hunter’s rule has not barred municipal standing when its citizens suffer a 
constitutional injury. While Williams states that a municipality “has no privileges 
or immunities under the federal constitution which it may invoke in opposition 
to the will of its creator,”60 suggesting a municipality should not be able to suffer 
a constitutional injury sufficient to possess Article III standing, cases such as 
Romer v. Evans and Washington v. Seattle School District No. 1 defy this inference. 
Municipal and private plaintiffs in Romer successfully challenged a state 
constitutional amendment prohibiting public action against discrimination of 
homosexual persons under the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth 
Amendment.61 In Seattle School District No. 1, the plaintiff local school district was 
allowed to sue the state to vindicate the district’s right to bus students out of their 
geographical district for desegregation purposes.62 The Court did not even discuss 
 
53 Bendor, supra note 23, at 413; see also Coleman v. Miller, 307 U.S. 433, 441 (1939) (“Being but 
creatures of the State, municipal corporations have no standing to invoke the contract clause or the 
provisions of the Fourteenth Amendment of the Constitution in opposition to the will of their 
creator.”); Williams v. Mayor of Baltimore, 289 U.S. 36, 47 (1933) (“[T]he respondents [are] without 
standing to invoke the protection of the Federal Constitution.”). 
54 Barron, supra note 30, at 2222 n.9. 
55 Williams, 289 U.S. at 36. 
56 Coleman, 307 U.S. at 433. 
57 504 U.S. 555, 560-61 (1992). 
58 588 F.2d 1057, 1070 (1979). Bendor notes that the “use of ‘standing’ in Williams and Coleman 
sounds more like the prudential zone-of-interests standing requirement.” Bendor, supra note 23 at 
414-15. As an example of how cities satisfy this requirement, Barron argues cities have a “quasi-
sovereign” interest in protecting the well-being of their residents. Barron, supra note 30, at 2242. 
59 Kathleen Morris examines four rationales for imposing prudential standing requirements 
and concludes none are satisfied by Hunter’s rule, either because Hunter’s purpose or progeny are not 
consistent with them. Morris, supra note 16, at 22-25. 
60 Williams, 289 U.S. at 40. 
61 517 U.S. 620, 623-24 (1996). 
62 458 U.S. 457, 478 (1982) (“School boards, of course, are given broad corporate powers . . . . 
Significantly for present purposes, school boards are directed to determine which students should 
be bused to school and to provide those students with transportation.”). 
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whether municipalities had standing in these cases to claim an injury to its citizens’ 
constitutional rights under the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth 
Amendment.63 
Hunter has been invoked to dismiss arguments made by municipal 
defendants.64 However, standing is a doctrine governing who may bring a 
legal claim, not who may assert a legal defense.65 And yet, “not all of the local 
public entities in the Hunter line of cases were even claimants . . . [with] some 
invok[ing] the Constitution only defensively, as a shield against statutory 
claims.”66 Because “the Hunter line also bars localities from invoking the 
Constitution defensively,” it cannot be a decision about standing.67 
State court decisions about standing are outside the Supreme Court’s 
jurisdiction, yet it has reviewed state decisions decided on Hunter grounds. 
Because state standing doctrine is “entirely a matter of state law,” the federal 
judiciary has no authority to define the jurisprudence.68 If Hunter were a 
matter of state standing, the Supreme Court could not have affirmed either 
City of Trenton or Hunter itself.69 Additionally, since standing is plaintiff 
specific, the Court in Hunter would have only dismissed the municipal 
plaintiff, leaving the private plaintiffs’ claim intact.70 Instead, it dismissed the 
entire case. This suggests strongly that standing was not the animating 
principle behind Hunter’s rule. 
A separate minority view among scholars and lower courts is that Hunter 
sounds in capacity,71 the doctrine concerned with whether a party is qualified to 
 
63 See Bendor, supra note 23, at 391 (“[T]he Court has not explicitly addressed the presence of 
the municipalities in these cases . . . .”). 
64 See, e.g., City of Trenton v. New Jersey, 262 U.S. 182 (1923) (dismissing defendant 
municipality’s claim that it was protected from suit brought by the state to recover dues for use of a 
water supply based on the Contracts, Takings, and Due Process Clauses); Attorney Gen. ex rel. Kies 
v. Lowrey, 199 U.S. 233 (1905) (dismissing defendant school board’s challenge to a state law 
mandating reorganization claiming it violated the Contracts, Due Process, and Republican Form of 
Government Clauses because the state legislature’s creation of the school board prevented 
constitutional interference); Williams v. Eggleston, 170 U.S. 304 (1898) (dismissing defendant town’s 
claims in defense under the Contracts Clause). 
65 See Bendor, supra note 23, at 415 (“[S]tanding does not limit the arguments that a party can 
make in defense if it is sued.”). 
66 Morris, supra note 16, at 22. 
67 Id. at 3 n.4. 
68 Virginia v. Hicks, 539 U.S. 113, 120 (2003) (“Our standing rules limit only the federal courts’ 
jurisdiction over certain claims. ‘[S]tate courts are not bound by the limitations of a case or 
controversy or other federal rules of justiciability even when they address issues of federal law.’” 
(citing ASARCO Inc. v. Kadish, 490 U.S. 605, 617 (1989))). 
69 See Bendor, supra note 23, at 416 (suggesting the Supreme Court’s affirmation of these cases militates 
against Hunter being viewed as a doctrine of standing and instead a doctrine of substantive constitutional law). 
70 Id. (“In Hunter itself, the plaintiffs included both residents of Allegheny and the city itself.”). 
71 See Morris, supra note 16, at 18 (arguing that by defining the nature of municipal 
corporations, the Court in Hunter created federal common law); see also Bendor, supra note 23, at 416 
(describing the “minority view that Hunter is about municipal capacity to sue and be sued”). 
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take part in litigation.72 In Hunter, the Court noted that it had in the past 
“decide[d] the nature of municipal corporations.”73 Because Hunter purported to 
define what localities “are”—that is, political subdivisions of the state—and deny 
them the protection of constitutional provisions because of that intrinsic nature, 
Hunter has been viewed by some as a decision about the capacity of a locality to 
bring suit under constitutional provisions.74 According to Bender, “the capacity 
to sue and be sued is ‘defined as a party’s personal right to come into court.’”75 
Hunter defines the character of localities in a way that denies them independence, 
and thus the separation from the state necessary to bring suit against it.76 
There are several persuasive arguments that Hunter is not a decision about 
capacity. First, Hunter has been applied to bar private plaintiffs from suing 
states, an outcome that cannot be related to the nature of municipal 
plaintiffs.77 If Hunter determines the capacity of municipal plaintiffs, then 
private plaintiffs should be unaffected just as if it were a doctrine of standing. 
Second, Hunter fails to completely bar constitutional suits by and against 
municipalities. A lack of capacity is a complete bar to bringing suit or being 
sued.78 And yet, localities have been able to bring constitutional claims against 
their state under the Supremacy, Contracts, and Establishment Clauses.79 
Cities can also sue their state in tort80 and are conspicuous subjects of civil 
rights suits under § 1983.81 Third, the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure 
explicitly command that state law govern whether a party has capacity to 
sue.82 Rule 17 is an explicit congressional mandate that the courts defer to 
 
72 Capacity generally addresses such considerations as a party’s mental competence due to age 
or insanity. See Morris, supra note 16, at 25 (noting that capacity “concerns, in sum, ‘the personal 
qualifications of a party to litigate’” (citing 6A CHARLES ALAN WRIGHT & ARTHUR R. MILLER, 
FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE § 1559 (3d ed. 1998))). 
73 Hunter v. City of Pittsburgh, 207 U.S. 161, 177-78 (1907). 
74 See Morris, supra note 16, at 25 (noting that Hunter “bars localities from invoking the federal 
constitution against their own states because of what they ‘are’”). Indeed, Hunter has been 
interpreted as a decision about municipal capacity to sue in some courts. See, e.g., City of New York 
v. State, 655 N.E.2d 649, 651 (N.Y. 1995) (concluding that “municipal plaintiffs lack the legal capacity 
to bring this suit against the State”). 
75 Bendor, supra note 23, at 416-17 (citing WRIGHT & MILLER, supra note 72). 
76 See Morris, supra note 16, at 26 (interpreting Hunter to mean municipalities “lack the necessary 
independence that is a precondition to alleging a constitutional violation against their states”). 
77 See Bendor, supra note 23, at 416 (“In Hunter itself, the plaintiffs included both residents of 
Allegheny and the city itself.”).  
78 Id. at 417 (“[I]f an entity does not have the capacity to sue and be sued, its inability to sue is total.”). 
79 See supra notes 42–44 and accompanying text (describing cases in which municipal claims 
have been considered on the merits under the Supremacy Clause, the Contracts Clause, and the 
First Amendment Establishment Clause). 
80 See Bendor, supra note 23, at 417 (“Municipalities can sue in contract and tort.”). 
81 See, e.g., Monell v. Dep’t of Soc. Serv., 436 U.S. 658 (1978) (holding that municipal 
corporations can be sued under § 1983). 
82 FED. R. CIV. P. 17(b)(3) (“Capacity to sue or be sued is determined . . . by the law of the 
state where the court is located.”). 
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state law on capacity questions.83 If Hunter were a decision of capacity, it 
would violate this mandate. 
Furthermore, were Hunter a decision about capacity to sue, it would 
violate the ban on federal general common law laid down in Erie Railroad Co. 
v. Tompkins.84 The Erie Court held that there “is no federal general common 
law” and instead required the law of the states to be applied in all cases, 
“[e]xcept in matters governed by the Federal Constitution or by acts of 
Congress.”85 If Hunter were a decision of standing (an Article III matter) or 
of substantive constitutional law, Erie would be no bar since in both cases the 
doctrine would be tied to the Constitution and be within the Court’s 
authority.86 But as a capacity doctrine, “lower federal courts overreach their 
authority every time they apply [Hunter].”87 Hunter has not been revisited by 
the Court in light of Erie,88 but it seems clear that “the Hunter Court 
essentially conjured a federal common law definition of what localities are, 
and, based on that, what they can and cannot do.”89 Erie either militates for 
overruling Hunter as a decision of capacity, or it requires reading Hunter not 
as a definition of the nature of municipalities in terms of their capacity to 
bring suit because it would be “an unconstitutional assumption of powers” by 
the federal judiciary to so define them.90 
D. Hunter as Substantive Constitutional Law 
The majority view of Hunter is that it is a decision of substantive 
constitutional law.91 As such, local powerlessness is viewed as having been 
 
83 See Morris, supra note 16, at 26 (“Congress has directed the federal courts to defer to, rather 
than trump, state law in deciding capacity questions, and they typically do.”). 
84 304 U.S. 64, 78 (1938) (“Congress has no power to declare substantive rules of common law 
applicable in a State whether they be local in their nature or ‘general’ . . . . And no clause in the 
Constitution purports to confer such power upon the federal courts.”). 
85 Id. 
86 Morris, supra note 16, at 26 (“If the Hunter doctrine dealt with either standing or substantive 
constitutional law, it would not be surprising that the Court developed a federal common law rule 
addressing that subject, since even after Erie, the Court is free to develop federal common law that 
is tethered to the Constitution.”). 
87 Id. 
88 Id. at 18 (“No court or scholar has revisited Hunter in light of Erie.”). 
89 Id. at 15. 
90 Erie R.R. Co. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64, 79 (1938) (quoting Black & White Taxicab Co. v. Brown 
& Yellow Taxicab Co., 267 U.S. 518, 533 (1928) (Holmes, J., dissenting)); see also Morris, supra note 16, at 
18 (“[N]either the Constitution nor any other body of federal law grants the Court—or, for that matter, 
any branch of the federal government—the authority to define localities or determine how power is 
allocated within the several States. Such authority belongs to the People of the several States.”). 
91 See Lawrence, supra note 36, at 101 (characterizing the Fifth Circuit’s reasoning in Rogers v. 
Brockette, 588 F.2d 1057 (5th Cir. 1979), as holding that Gomillion limited the effect of Hunter to the 
substantive constitutional provisions at issue, rather than being a decision of standing). 
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“appended” to the specific constitutional provisions addressed in cases where 
Hunter was applied.92 Whether Hunter should apply only to a few 
constitutional provisions or to all substantive constitutional provisions is 
debatable.93 The Court’s inconsistency in applying the Hunter doctrine has 
forced lower courts to recognize that it is not the absolute bar it appears to 
be.94 Several Courts of Appeals decisions deal with this scattered application 
by interpreting Hunter and its progeny to be decisions of substantive 
constitutional law,95 announcing the substantive principle that the 
“Constitution does not interfere with a state’s internal political 
organization.”96 The Second Circuit is the most permissive, barring municipal 
plaintiff claims against the state only under the Fourteenth Amendment.97 
Most lower courts and scholars cite Gomillion v. Lightfoot for support when 
interpreting Hunter as a limited decision of substantive constitutional law.98 
In that case, the municipal residents successfully challenged the state’s 
gerrymander of their municipality’s boundaries into a twenty-eight-sided 
 
92 See Morris, supra note 16, at 20 (suggesting that the Hunter doctrine “impliedly” attaches to 
substantive constitutional provisions). 
93 Scholarly arguments exist on both sides of this debate. Compare id. at 21 (rejecting the narrow 
substantive interpretation of Hunter that only specific constitutional protections are denied localities 
because the Court has applied Hunter to a “very wide swath of economic, civil rights, and structural 
constitutional claims” and citing cases barring claims under the Takings, Contracts, Due Process, 
and Equal Protection Clauses), with Barron, supra note 35, at 566-67 (concluding that Gomillion limits 
Hunter to specific constitutional provisions by prohibiting a state from using its power over 
municipalities “as an instrument for circumventing a federally protected right”), and Bendor, supra note 
23, at 397 (determining that Hunter “must be a doctrine of substantive constitutional law . . . because 
policy flexibility can only be preserved by a doctrine that protects state statutes from constitutional 
challenges regardless of procedural posture, party identity, or forum”). 
94 E.g., Rogers v. Brockette, 588 F.2d 1057, 1069 (5th Cir. 1979) (“In some respects the Court 
has retreated from [its] absolute position.”). 
95 Hunter is interpreted as a doctrine of substantive constitutional law in five circuits and 
several state appellate courts. See Branson v. Romer, 161 F.3d 619, 628 (10th Cir. 1998) (deciding 
there was jurisdiction for a federal court to hear a political subdivision’s Supremacy Clause claim, 
and holding that municipalities cannot bring federal constitutional claims when the provision used 
was written to protect individual rights, as opposed to structural rights); Carlyn v. City of Akron, 
726 F.2d 287, 288 (6th Cir. 1984) (deciding Hunter was a case about annexation); Rogers, 588 F.2d at 
1068 (denying on the merits a school district’s Supremacy Clause claim and stating, “We think 
Hunter and subsequent cases are substantive interpretations of the constitutional provisions 
involved”); City of New York v. Richardson, 473 F.2d 923, 933 (2nd Cir. 1973) (dismissing claims 
asserted by city plaintiffs against the state under the Fourteenth Amendment Equal Protection 
Clause); City of Tucson v. Pima Cty., 19 P.3d 650, 659 (Ariz. 2001) (applying Hunter only to 
intrastate political boundary disputes); Star-Kist Foods v. Cty. of Los Angeles, 719 P.2d 987, 992 
(Cal. 1986) (permitting a Commerce Clause challenge on the merits). 
96 Rogers, 588 F.2d at 1070. 
97 See Morris, supra note 16, at 19 (“The Second Circuit interprets the Hunter doctrine as 
barring only Fourteenth Amendment claims.” (citing Richardson, 473 F.2d at 929)). 
98 See Lawrence, supra note 36, at 101 (“Gomillion thus sets forth the important principle that 
there are constitutional limits to the degree of control that may be asserted by a state over municipal 
corporations, through legislation or otherwise.”). 
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figure under the Fourteenth and Fifteenth Amendments. In rejecting the 
state’s argument that under Hunter it could “at its pleasure . . . expand or 
contract the territorial area” of its cities,99 the Court declared that it “has never 
acknowledged that the States have power to do as they will with municipal 
corporations regardless of consequences. Legislative control of municipalities, 
no less than other state power, lies within the scope of relevant limitations 
imposed by the United States Constitution.”100 The Court continued: 
[A] correct reading of the seemingly unconfined dicta of Hunter and kindred 
cases is not that the State has plenary power to manipulate in every 
conceivable way, for every conceivable purpose, the affairs of its municipal 
corporations, but rather that the State’s authority is unrestrained by the 
particular prohibitions of the Constitution considered in those cases.101 
Combined with the Shadow Doctrine,102 which tends to permit municipal 
plaintiffs to make claims against their state under specific constitutional 
provisions like the Equal Protection and Supremacy Clauses, Gomillion’s explicit 
limitation of Hunter strongly supports the conclusion that some constitutional 
provisions are available to protect municipal plaintiffs from state control. 
Hunter and its progeny also reflect their substantive nature by permitting 
the state power to “grant” privileges to their political subdivisions, including 
the ability to sue under state law.103 If Hunter was a decision of standing or 
capacity, states could not grant cities the ability to sue even under state law.104 
Further, if the underlying purpose of Hunter was to give states the power to 
define their relationship with their own subdivisions,105 then the doctrine 
cannot withhold the power to authorize municipal suits under state law 
without betraying its deference to state autonomy. Therefore, Hunter makes 
the most analytic sense as a doctrine of substantive constitutional law, 
permitting municipalities to at least raise some constitutional claims against 
their states when their citizens’ rights are violated by a state’s exercise of 
 
99 Hunter v. City of Pittsburgh, 207 U.S. 161, 178 (1907). 
100 Gomillion v. Lightfoot, 364 U.S. 339, 344-45 (1960). 
101 Id. at 344. 
102 See supra note 39 and accompanying text. 
103 See City of Trenton v. New Jersey, 262 U.S. 182, 187 (1923) (“[The] state may withhold, 
grant or withdraw powers and privileges as it sees fit.”). 
104 See supra note 65 and accompanying text (discussing standing as a bar to suit); see also supra 
note 77 and accompanying text (discussing capacity as a bar to suit). 
105 As Justice Stevens suggested in dissent in Ysursa v. Pocatello, the Court’s decisions have 
attached “constitutional significance [to] the relationship a State chooses to establish with its political 
subdivisions.” 555 U.S. 353, 374 (2008) (Stevens, J., dissenting); see also Barron, supra note 35, at 562 
(“Although the cases are legion that assert that state law defines the scope of local governmental power, 
none has done so more forcefully, or more famously, than Hunter v. City of Pittsburgh.”). 
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control over them, and perhaps even come under the protective umbrella of 
some of those constitutional provisions themselves. 
Assuming Gomillion limits Hunter to substantive provisions of the 
Constitution, the narrowest interpretation of its holding permits the 
inference that municipalities may sue their state, at least when the 
constitutional rights of their citizens are violated.106 At its broadest, Gomillion 
can be read to suggest that municipalities may possess some limited 
constitutional rights of their own which they can enforce against the state. 
This interpretation is bolstered by cases like Washington v. Seattle School 
District No. 1, which suggests that a locality may make constitutional 
challenges to state laws not only when it sues to vindicate the rights of its 
residents, but also when such laws restrain the locality’s own powers. 
The majority in Seattle School District No. 1 framed the debate as “whether 
an elected local school board may use the Fourteenth Amendment to defend 
its program of busing for integration from attack by the State.”107 The 
locality’s own program was at issue, not the local school board’s assertion of a 
right it held in trust for the citizens it served. The majority not only 
considered, but approved, the locality’s claim over the dissent’s argument that 
this would allow “local governmental bodies [to] forever pre-empt the ability 
of a State—the sovereign power—to address a matter of compelling concern 
to the State.”108 The dissent viewed this decision as a subordination of the 
state’s power to control decisions of its own subdivision. Yet it seems the 
majority was subordinating the state to the Fourteenth Amendment, further 
limiting the substantive reach of Hunter by suggesting that localities can 
access structural constitutional rights. 
While the First Amendment’s protection of speech is considered to be an 
individual right, it undeniably serves structural interests in the free flow of 
information.109 The next Part examines whether the First Amendment’s 
protection of this structural interest also protects the speech of municipalities 
and, if so, whether the protection may be asserted against the locality’s own state. 
II. THE DOCTRINE OF GOVERNMENT SPEECH 
Whether a municipal government, or indeed any government entity, is 
entitled to the protection of the First Amendment Free Speech Clause is a 
 
106 The Tenth Circuit agrees with this interpretation. See City of Hugo v. Nichols, 656 F.3d 
1251, 1259 (10th Cir. 2011) (“Gomillion stands for the commonsense, limited proposition that a state’s 
actions vis-à-vis municipalities may impact the rights of individuals living in the communities and 
that those impacted individuals are not denied the protections of the Constitution merely because 
the municipality itself is not contemplated by the constitutional provisions.”). 
107 458 U.S. 457, 459 (1982) (emphasis added). 
108 Id. at 495 (Powell, J., dissenting). 
109 See discussion infra Section III.B. 
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matter of judicial and scholarly debate. This Part first examines whether 
municipal corporations may assert any rights under the federal Constitution, 
and concludes that constitutional protections are certainly available to 
municipalities when they act in a proprietary capacity or when they are 
asserting the rights of their citizens. Second, this Part surveys the doctrinal 
foundations of the government speech doctrine that government speech is 
both insulated from restriction by and exempted from protection under the 
First Amendment Free Speech Clause. This Part concludes by recognizing 
that the Court has ruled definitively in favor of insulation but ambiguously 
on protection of government speech. 
A. The Rights of a Municipal Corporation 
To answer the question of whether municipal corporations are protected 
under the First Amendment Free Speech Clause, one might be tempted to 
consider the rights of private corporations by analogy. Private corporations 
are protected under the Fourteenth Amendment,110 and through it, the First 
Amendment Free Speech Clause.111 The Court’s decision in First National 
Bank of Boston v. Bellotti seemed to indicate it was open to including municipal 
corporations within the Amendment’s reach when it said “the First 
Amendment does not ‘belong’ to any definable category of persons or 
entities: It belongs to all who exercise its freedoms.”112 Later cases revealed, 
however, “the beguiling symmetry apparent in the notion of treating 
government entities as the constitutional equivalents of private corporations 
[does not] find much support in constitutional decisions.”113 
Still, municipal corporations possess some constitutional rights and 
privileges, particularly when they raise those rights in their proprietary 
capacity or on behalf of their citizens.114 In United States v. 50 Acres of Land, 
 
110 See Pembina Consol. Silver Mining & Milling Co. v. Pennsylvania, 125 U.S. 181, 188-89 
(1888) (“The inhibition of the amendment that no state shall deprive any person within its 
jurisdiction of the equal protection of the laws, was designed to prevent any person or class of 
persons from being singled out as a special subject for discriminating and hostile legislation. Under 
the designation of ‘person’ there is no doubt that a private corporation is included.”). 
111 See First Nat’l Bank of Bos. v. Bellotti, 435 U.S. 765, 776 (1978) (“The proper question 
therefore is not whether corporations ‘have’ First Amendment rights and, if so, whether they are 
coextensive with those of natural persons. Instead, the question must be whether [the law] abridges 
expression that the First Amendment was meant to protect. We hold that it does.”). 
112 Id. at 802. 
113 Yudof, supra note 13, at 867; see also, e.g., MARK G. YUDOF, WHEN GOVERNMENT SPEAKS 
44 (1983) (noting the Court rejected an argument equating municipal and private corporations under 
the Constitution, “albeit ambiguously,” in Williams v. Mayor of Baltimore). 
114 See YUDOF, supra note 113, at 44 n.28 (noting that while the Bill of Rights has not been 
extended to government bodies, municipalities have been allowed to raise constitutional claims in 
their proprietary capacity or when asserting the rights of their citizens). 
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the municipal party was permitted to raise a Fifth Amendment Takings 
Clause claim in its own right against the federal government.115 This holding 
may counsel that other constitutional rights could be held by municipalities 
under certain circumstances.116 In City of Philadelphia v. New Jersey, the Court 
entertained a municipal plaintiff ’s claim that state action violated the 
Commerce Clause, further indicating that the Court is open to considering 
municipal constitutional claims.117 Lower federal courts have also permitted 
municipalities to raise constitutional rights, including Due Process Clause 
claims under the Fourteenth Amendment.118 These cases show, at the very least, 
that municipal corporations can possess constitutional rights by and for 
themselves under existing Supreme Court precedent, and that in circuits such as 
the Third Circuit where municipal entities are considered “persons” for purposes 
of the Fifth Amendment, those rights may include guarantees against state 
infringement through the Due Process Clause, including a First Amendment 
right to speak. However, because speech by a government entity poses different 
issues than speech by private entities, it has earned its own unique doctrine. 
B. Foundations of the Government Speech Doctrine 
The common wisdom of government speech is that the First Amendment 
does not apply to government expression because the Free Speech Clause 
specifically protects speech from government regulation. The Court has said 
that “[t]he Free Speech Clause restricts government regulation of private 
speech; it does not regulate government speech.”119 This rule “leaves 
 
115 469 U.S. 24, 31 (1984) (defining “private property” under the Takings Clause to include 
property held by public entities); see also Morris, supra note 16, at 21 n.125 (noting the Court 
considered a city’s Takings Clause claim on the merits in United States v. 50 Acres of Land); Eugene 
Volokh, Do State and Local Governments Have Free Speech Rights?, WASH. POST, (June 24, 2015), 
https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/volokh-conspiracy/wp/2015/06/24/do-state-and-local-gover
nments-have-free-speech-rights/?utm_term=.d9a0beb7655c [https://perma.cc/9RSY-Y3G9] (citing 
50 Acres for the proposition that government entities can possess some constitutional rights.). 
116 See David Fagundes, State Actors as First Amendment Speakers, 100 NW. U. L. REV. 1637, 1650 
(2006) (“50 Acres could also be read more ambitiously as an indication that, where appropriate, the 
protections of the Bill of Rights—whether of speech or property—apply as much to state and local 
governments as they do to natural persons.”). 
117 437 U.S. 617, 618 (1978); see also Morris, supra note 16, at 21 n.125 (noting the Court’s 
consideration of the city’s Commerce Clause claim on the merits as support for the proposition that 
cities may assert constitutional claims). 
118 See, e.g., In re Real Estate Title & Settlement Servs. Antitrust Litig., 869 F.2d 760, 765 n.3 
(3d Cir. 1989) (holding school boards are “persons” within the meaning of the Fifth Amendment 
and thus entitled to due process because they are more like private corporations than the state). 
119 Pleasant Grove City v. Summum, 555 U.S. 460, 467 (2009); see also Ronald D. Rotunda & John 
E. Nowak, Treatise on Constitutional Law—Substance & Procedure: Government Speech and Propaganda, 
5 TREATISE ON CONST. L., §20.11(b) (2016) (“[T]he Free Speech Clause restricts government regulation 
of private speech but not speech by the government.”); Randall P. Bezanson & William G. Buss, The Many 
Faces of Government Speech, 86 IOWA L. REV. 1377, 1501 (2001) (arguing that recognizing government 
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legislatures free to enact laws limiting government speech—and they often 
do so.”120 State statutes restricting the release of PWBC data are one of many 
instances of government speech restricted under this regime.121 However, 
while the decision of a legislature to limit the speech of its own branch or body 
of government is a decision of a single entity not to speak, such state laws are less 
easily justified when applied to municipalities without the Hunter doctrine 
defining them as powerless subdivisions lacking any and all privileges against the 
state. If the argument in Part I of this Comment is persuasive, then it matters 
very much to the constitutionality of these laws whether government entities, 
particularly municipalities, are protected under the Free Speech Clause. 
Government speech is a “relatively new category”122 that is “recently 
minted”123 and “correspondingly imprecise.”124 It is a doctrine without well-
defined limits lacking a well-developed guiding principle or policy analysis.125 
As early as 1976, the Court recognized that municipal corporations may come 
within the protection of the First Amendment, though it declined to decide 
the issue at that time.126 It was not until 2001, when the Court finally used 
the term “government speech” that the doctrine had its beginning.127 
However, the Court has never expressly defined the extent of a municipality’s 
 
expression as a subject of First Amendment protection is inconsistent with the Constitution’s purpose); 
Yudof, supra note 13, at 867 (“The historic purpose of the first amendment has been to limit government, 
not to serve as a source of government rights.”). 
120 Helen Norton, Government Speech in Transition, 57 S.D. L. REV. 421, 423 n.16 (2012). 
121 See Helen Norton, Campaign Speech Law with a Twist: When the Government is the Speaker, 
Not the Regulator, 61 EMORY L.J. 209, 229-30, 260-61 (2011) (describing various statutes which 
constrain government speech at the federal and state levels). 
122 Summum, 555 U.S. at 487 (Souter, J., concurring). 
123 Id. at 481 (Stevens, J., concurring). 
124 Johanns v. Livestock Mktg. Ass’n, 544 U.S. 550, 574 (2005) (Souter, J., dissenting). 
125 See Charles W. Rhodes, The First Amendment Structure for Speakers and Speech, 44 SETON 
HALL L. REV. 395, 418 (2014) (“The Court’s approach to date has been piecemeal, resolving the 
presented issues in each case with undertheorized conclusions.”); Rotunda & Nowak, supra note 119 
(noting the Court has not clearly defined limits on when a government may issue reports designed 
to support government positions on foreign policy). 
126 See City of Madison, Joint Sch. Dist. No. 8 v. Wis. Employ’t Relations Comm’n, 429 U.S. 
167, 175 n.7 (1976) (“We need not decide whether a municipal corporation . . . has First Amendment 
rights to hear the views of its citizens and employees.”) 
127 See David S. Day, Government Speech: An Introduction to a Constitutional Dialogue, 57 S.D. L. 
REV. 389, 390 (2012) (arguing Legal Services Corp. v. Velazquez, 531 U.S. 533 (2001), was the beginning 
of the government speech doctrine rather than Rust v. Sullivan, 500 U.S. 173 (1991), because in Legal 
Services Corp. Kennedy stated the Court has interpreted Rust as a decision of government speech); 
see also Mark Strasser, Government Speech and Circumvention of the First Amendment, 44 HASTINGS 
CONST. L.Q. 37, 38-39 (2016) (noting that Rust is characterized as the first government speech case, 
but “was not so understood at the time it was issued”). 
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First Amendment right to speak, nor whether it has this right at all.128 
Instead, the Court has continually reserved the question for another day. 
The Court most recently explicitly declined to address the question of 
whether government entities have First Amendment speech rights in United 
States v. American Library Ass’n.129 Against the local library’s claim that 
conditioning federal library funding on installing internet filters violated the 
First Amendment, the federal government defendant argued that public libraries 
as “[g]overnment entities do not have First Amendment rights.”130 Despite the 
issue being fully briefed by both parties and regarded by the lower court to favor 
public libraries having First Amendment speech rights,131 the Court ducked the 
question, stating “[w]e need not decide this question because . . . this claim would 
fail on the merits.”132 Instead, the Court held that the government had broad 
discretion to make content-based judgments when choosing what private speech 
to make available to the public, and the conditional nature of the funds merely 
required the libraries to spend “it for the purposes for which they were 
authorized.”133 As such, whether government speech, at any level, is entitled to 
First Amendment protection remains an open question. 
The open question of government speech rests upon language in Columbia 
Broadcasting Systems, Inc. v. Democratic National Committee134 (CBS), language 
which is considered by some to be the foundation for the modern government 
speech doctrine.135 In CBS, a private radio broadcaster refused to sell airtime 
to the DNC and the Business Executives Movement for Vietnam Peace because it 
did not want to run paid editorial advertisements on controversial issues.136 The 
Court accepted the broadcaster’s argument that broadcasters were not required to 
accept editorial advertisements under the First Amendment.137 
 
128 See Note, The Constitutionality of Municipal Advocacy, supra note 12, at 540 n.24 (noting the 
Court’s reservation of the question in City of Madison Joint School Dist. No. 8). 
129 539 U.S. 194, 210-11 (2003). 
130 Id. at 210. 
131 Am. Library Ass’n v. United States, 201 F. Supp. 2d 401, 490-92, 492 n.36 (E.D. Pa. 2002) 
(“[T]he notion that public libraries may assert First Amendment rights for the purpose of making 
an unconstitutional conditions claim is clearly plausible, and may well be correct.”), rev’d on other 
grounds, United States v. Am. Library Ass’n, Inc., 539 U.S. 194 (2003). 
132 American Library Ass’n, 539 U.S. at 211. 
133 Id. at 211-12 (quoting Rust v. Sullivan, 500 U.S. 173, 196 (1991)). 
134 412 U.S. 94 (1973) [hereinafter CBS]. The Government defendant in American Library Ass’n 
cited CBS for the proposition that government entities receive no First Amendment speech 
protections. See American Library Ass’n, 539 U.S. at 210-11. 
135 See Fagundes, supra note 116, at 1641-42 (“The principle that government entities cannot 
claim the protection of the First Amendment found its first judicial expression in Justice Stewart’s 
concurrence in Columbia Broadcasting System”). 
136 CBS, 412 U.S. at 94. 
137 Id. at 95 (“The ‘public interest’ standard of the Communications Act, which incorporates 
First Amendment principles, does not require broadcasters to accept editorial advertisements.”). 
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In denying the petitioner’s claim that the broadcaster was a government 
actor bound by the First Amendment, Justice Stewart’s concurrence pointed 
out that the broadcaster’s journalistic discretion to refuse paid advertising 
editorials would be completely eliminated if it were a government actor, an 
unacceptable result.138 In oft-quoted (but seldom analyzed) dicta,139 Justice 
Stewart explained “[t]he First Amendment protects the press from governmental 
interference; it confers no analogous protection on the Government.”140 Justice 
Stewart explained the government was exempt from both restriction and 
protection under the Free Speech Clause because “[t]he purpose of the first 
amendment is to protect private expression” and “[g]overnment is not restrained 
by the First Amendment from controlling its own expression.”141 
C. Weaknesses of the Government Speech Doctrine 
Twin assertions form the core of the government speech doctrine: 
Government speech is not restricted by the First Amendment and, because it is 
not offered by a private speaker, it is also not protected under that Amendment. 
The first assertion is cited with approval in more recent cases,142 most notably in 
Matal v. Tam and Pleasant Grove City v. Summum, the latter of which held the 
placement of religious monuments in public parks was government speech and 
thus outside the restrictions of the First Amendment.143 This principle allows the 
government to control its own speech in ways that would be unconstitutional 
if applied to other speakers.144 The justification for this exemption is that the 
government needs to be able to communicate its policies and information to 
 
138 Id. at 140 (Stewart, J., concurring) (“To hold that broadcaster action is governmental action 
would thus produce a result wholly inimical to the broadcasters’ own First Amendment rights”). 
139 Because the Court held private broadcasters were not state actors, despite being licensed 
by the federal government, the CBS decision rests on the theory that content-discrimination is 
permissible when it is the subject of an exercise of journalistic discretion by a “public trustee.” Id. at 
95. Because no government speech was at issue, Justice Stewart’s conclusions about government 
speech were not necessary premises for the holding and are thus pure dicta. 
140 Id. at 139 (Stewart, J., concurring). 
141 Id. at 139 n.7 (citations omitted). 
142 See, e.g., Johanns v. Livestock Mktg. Ass’n, 544 U.S. 550, 550 (2005) (denying the First 
Amendment challenge of meat producers who did not want to support a government campaign 
supporting generic beef production because government control of the campaign made it 
functionally government speech and thus exempt from First Amendment restrictions). 
143 Matal v. Tam, 137 S. Ct. 1744, 1748 (2017); Pleasant Grove City v. Summum, 555 U.S. 460, 
467 (2009) (citing CBS for the proposition that the “Free Speech Clause restricts government 
regulation of private speech; it does not regulate government speech”). 
144 See Fagundes, supra note 116, at 1642 (arguing a foundation of the CBS principle is Justice 
Stewart’s “unambitious claim” that the federal government may restrain its own expression without 
limit); Strasser, supra note 127, at 37 (“The First Amendment . . . does not impose . . . constraints 
on the government’s ability to craft its own message.”). 
984 University of Pennsylvania Law Review [Vol. 166: 961 
the public in viewpoint-discriminatory ways.145 Arguments along these lines 
are numerous and persuasive.146 However, justifying the exemption of 
government speech from First Amendment restriction is beyond the scope of 
this Comment. Further, denying government speech such an exemption is not 
necessary to argue for granting it First Amendment protection. That a 
“government entity has a right to ‘speak for itself ’” is not inconsistent with 
granting protections to that speech.147 
The second assertion of Justice Stewart’s dicta, that government speech 
merits no First Amendment protection, has not been a necessary premise of 
any Supreme Court rulings and thus remains dicta.148 The Court has multiple 
times passed over the opportunity to rule on this issue since CBS was 
decided.149 Perhaps this is because the assumed exemption from speech 
protection cannot withstand the multitude of cases that describe First 
Amendment protections as serving interests far beyond individual 
autonomy.150 Recognizing this weakness, some lower courts refuse to abide by 
the spirit of the CBS principle. In County of Suffolk v. Long Island Lighting Co., 
the court equated municipal and private corporations, stating “[a] municipal 
corporation, like any corporation, is protected under the First Amendment 
in the same manner as an individual.”151 In Creek v. Village of Westhaven, Judge 
 
145 See Matal, 137 S. Ct. at 1757 (“[I]mposing a requirement of viewpoint-neutrality on 
government speech would be paralyzing. When a government entity embarks on a course of action, 
it necessarily takes a particular viewpoint and rejects others. The Free Speech Clause does not 
require government to maintain viewpoint neutrality when its officers and employees speak about 
that venture.”); Strasser, supra note 127, at 37 (“Prohibiting the government as a speaker from favoring 
one message over another would, as a practical matter, preclude the government from speaking at all—an 
untenable result.”); Recent Case, First Amendment—Freedom of Speech—Government Speech—Walker 
v. Texas Division, Sons of Confederate Veterans, Inc., 129 HARV. L. REV. 221, 225 (2015) (“[G]overnment must 
have the ability to communicate in support of its policies or to take a position”). 
146 However, it is amusing (in a frustrating way) to note that coupling the exemption of 
government speech from First Amendment restriction with Hunter’s local powerlessness doctrine 
has the result of preventing localities from communicating their message to the public on the 
justification that government needs to be able to communicate its message to the public without 
First Amendment restriction. 
147 Summum, 555 U.S. at 467 (citing Board of Regents of Univ. of Wis. System v. 
Southworth, 529 U.S. 217, 229 (2000)). 
148 See Fagundes, supra note 116, at 1643 (“For all the times federal courts have echoed Stewart’s 
concurrence, they have invariably done so in descriptive asides, resulting in multiple incidents of 
dicta; but it has not been employed as the dispositive element of a holding.”); see also Matal, 137 S. 
Ct. at 1760 (holding a federally registered trademark is not government speech, yet commenting 
without elaboration that if it were government speech, it would “eliminate[] all First Amendment 
protection”); supra Section II.B (discussing United States v. American Library Ass’n). 
149 See City of Madison, Joint Sch. Dist. No. 8 v. Wis. Employment Relations Comm’n, 429 
U.S. 167 (1976); United States v. Am. Library Ass’n, 539 U.S. 194 (2003). 
150 See Fagundes, supra note 116, at 1662 (arguing the “CBS principle thus fails because it falsely 
assumes that an important First Amendment value is the only First Amendment value”). 
151 710 F. Supp. 1387, 1390 (E.D.N.Y. 1989) (citing First Nat’l Bank of Bos. v. Bellotti, 435 U.S. 
765, 776-84 (1978)); see Matthew C. Porterfield, State and Local Foreign Policy Initiatives and Free 
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Posner, writing for the Seventh Circuit, suggested that states and 
municipalities should enjoy constitutional speech rights when their speech 
represents the aggregated expression of their constituent members.152 Finally, 
in deciding American Library Ass’n, the Eastern District of Pennsylvania 
stated “the notion that public libraries may assert First Amendment rights 
. . . is clearly plausible, and may well be correct.”153 This interpretation was 
left intact by the Supreme Court’s refusal to decide the issue on appeal.154 
The lower court cases reflect an opinion held by many scholars that 
Stewart’s dicta is applied “without critical reflection.”155 Because the Court 
expressly declined to rule whether a government speaker could ever be 
protected under the First Amendment when the government defendant 
explicitly cited CBS for that proposition, it seems clear the Court has yet to 
approve of that dicta. Further, Justice Stevens’s dissent in American Library 
Ass’n indicates that government entities should receive speech protections.156 
The issue’s explicit openness and Justice Stevens’s suggestion that municipal 
speech should receive protection under the First Amendment in some 
situations indicates there is another way to answer the question rather than a 
blanket refusal of protection. 
One way to read the CBS dicta is that it merely enshrines the common 
wisdom that “when the government speaks[,] individuals and groups cannot 
use the Free Speech Clause to challenge a government message that conflicts 
with private viewpoints.”157 Under this reading, CBS only truly establishes the 
first principle identified above, that government speech is not restricted by 
the First Amendment and therefore cannot be subject to individual claims on 
that basis.158 This understanding of CBS is bolstered by the Court’s recent 
 
Speech: The First Amendment as an Instrument of Federalism, 35 STAN. J. INT’L L. 1, 34 (1999) (noting 
the district court in Long Island Lighting Co. “held that a county’s expression of its opposition to a 
nuclear power plant before state and federal agencies and the state legislature constituted an exercise 
of free speech and freedom of petition protected under the First Amendment”). 
152 80 F.3d 186, 192-93 (7th Cir. 1996) (“Nor is it out of the question that a municipality could 
have First Amendment rights.”). 
153 Am. Library Ass’n v. United States, 201 F. Supp. 2d 401, 490 n.36 (2002), rev’d on other 
grounds, 539 U.S. 194 (2003). 
154 See United States v. Am. Library Ass’n, Inc., 539 U.S. at 211. 
155 Fagundes, supra note 116, at 1643; see also Norton, supra note 121, at 215 (exploring “when, if 
ever, governmental campaign speech is sufficiently dangerous to justify a departure from the general 
rule that the government’s own speech is insulated from Free Speech Clause review”). 
156 See Fagundes, supra note 116, at 1646 (noting Justice Stevens’s dissenting “conclusion that 
the federal statute at issue unconstitutionally conditioned funding to municipal libraries on 
surrendering their First Amendment rights implied that the speech of municipal corporations (and 
their subdivisions, such as public libraries) enjoyed constitutional protection”). 
157 Nelda H. Cambron-McCabe, When Government Speaks: An Examination of the Evolving 
Government Speech Doctrine, 274 EDUC. L. REP. 753, 754 (2012). 
158 Id. at 756-57 (reviewing the Court’s handling of claims that government speech is exempt 
from First Amendment challenges); Norton, supra note 121, at 212 (“[T]he Court has made clear that 
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opinion in Walker v. Texas Division, Sons of Confederate Veterans, Inc., in which 
it stated “[w]hen government speaks, it is not barred by the Free Speech 
Clause from determining the content of what it says.”159 
Walker featured a First Amendment challenge to the Texas DMV’s 
decision not to issue the private plaintiffs a specialty license plate featuring 
the Confederate flag. The Court held that specialty license plates were “meant 
to convey and have the effect of conveying a government message,” and 
accordingly “constitute government speech.”160 On this basis, the Court held 
that private parties could not force the state to issue specific specialty license 
plates featuring messages it did not endorse, equating the government’s 
ability to be free of such compulsion with that of the plaintiffs themselves 
when it stated “just as Texas cannot require SCV to convey ‘the State’s 
ideological message’ . . . SCV cannot force Texas to include a Confederate 
battle flag on its specialty license plates.”161 Not only does this language from 
Walker confirm that government speech is exempt from First Amendment 
challenges,162 it suggests government entities may have speech rights because 
the right to be free from compelled speech has long been treated as a 
companion of the right to speak.163 Because the Court in Walker held 
government speech exempt from First Amendment restriction and suggested 
that exemption was because the plaintiffs could not compel the government 
to express its message, government speakers may possess speech rights.164 
 
the government’s own speech is exempt from Free Speech Clause scrutiny.”); Rhodes, supra note 125, 
at 418 (“[A] significant exception is that no private individual or entity can seek protection under 
the First Amendment when the speech at issue is attributed to the government or polity.”). 
159 135 S. Ct. 2239, 2245 (2015). 
160 Id. at 2250 (quoting Pleasant Grove City v. Summum, 555 U.S. 460, 472 (2009)). 
161 Id. at 2253 (quoting Wooley v. Maynard, 430 U.S. 705, 715 (1977)). 
162 Walker clearly allows government speech to be viewpoint discriminatory, reinforcing the 
principle that government speech is not subject to the First Amendment claims of private citizens. 
See Abner S. Greene, The Concept of the Speech Platform: Walker v. Texas Division, 68 ALA. L. REV. 
337, 358 (2016) (“The Court has made clear that such viewpoint selectivity in government speech is 
acceptable.”); Freedom of Speech—Government Speech—Walker v. Texas Division, Sons of Confederate 
Veterans, 129 HARV. L. REV. 221, 221 (2015) (noting that the “government . . . may regulate its own 
speech however it wishes, even when that speech involves the expression of private individuals”). 
163 See W. Va. State Bd. of Educ. v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624, 642 (1943) (holding the state may 
not compel the flag salute and pledge in schools because such a mandate “invades the sphere of 
intellect and spirit which it is the purpose of the First Amendment . . . to reserve from all official 
control”); see also Elrod v. Burns, 427 U.S. 347, 357 (1976) (prohibiting discharge of a public employee 
because of their political party affiliation because compelling or restraining belief and association “is 
inimical to the process which undergirds our system of government” and hinders “our ‘profound 
national commitment to the principle that debate on public issues should be uninhibited, robust, 
and wide-open’” (citing N.Y. Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 270 (1964))). 
164 See Eugene Volokh, Do State and Local Governments Have Free Speech Rights?, WASH. POST 
(June 24, 2015), https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/volokh-conspiracy/wp/2015/06/24/do-state-
and-local-governments-have-free-speech-rights/?utm_term=.d9a0beb7655c [https://perma.cc/P9F
C-ZFK8] (“This last sentence [of the Walker opinion] is of course not a square holding on this question 
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The Court has considered government entities to be cognizable First 
Amendment speakers in its decisions recognizing such entities have First 
Amendment interests. These decisions commonly concern “certain 
institutions with unique communicative functions—such as universities or 
broadcasters” and ultimately hold such institutions “may have First 
Amendment interests regardless of their public or private character.”165 In 
Regents of University of California v. Bakke, the Court upheld the public 
university’s racial plus-factor admissions rubric on the rationale that the 
school’s First Amendment interest in admitting students who would 
contribute to the “robust exchange of ideas” was a compelling interest 
sufficient to satisfy strict scrutiny under the Equal Protection Clause.166 The 
Court noted that “[a]cademic freedom, though not a specifically enumerated 
constitutional right, long has been viewed as a special concern of the First 
Amendment.”167 Bakke stands for the proposition that a public university has 
a First Amendment freedom to “determine the composition of its student 
body.”168 Whether public libraries are institutions which have similar First 
Amendment interests in determining the composition of their expressions to 
the public was not addressed by the Court in American Library Ass’n. Further, 
Justice Stevens’s dissent indicates public libraries should be among such 
institutions whose First Amendment interests give right to a First 
Amendment right to speak.169 Whether municipalities might be considered 
entities with similar First Amendment interests stemming from their 
representative capacity and the fact that “[t]he majority, as represented by its 
elected officials, has a right to speak”170 is, as of yet, undecided. 
Another argument for extending municipalities free speech protections 
comes by way of analogy. If state governments are able to assert speech 
protections against restrictions imposed by the federal government, it follows 
that entities with analogous sovereignty and independence should be able to 
 
of states’ rights to speak—or the right to be free from speech compulsions, which the Court has generally 
treated analogously to the right to speak. But it does seem to point in favor of such a First Amendment 
right possessed by state and local governments, with respect to federal regulations.”). 
165 Norton, supra note 120, at 423 n.16; see Kermit Roosevelt III, States as Speakers, 14 GOOD 
SOC’Y 62 n.9 (2005), http://digitalcommons.law.umaryland.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1026&
context=schmooze_papers [https://perma.cc/EBZ8-MWWA] (noting that “several recent Supreme 
Court decisions . . . assume (though sometimes only arguendo) that an entity’s status as a state actor 
makes no categorical difference to its First Amendment rights under federal regulation”); see also, 
Ark. Educ. Television Program Comm’n v. Forbes, 523 U.S. 666, 669 (1998) (recognizing a state 
cable channel had speech interests equivalent to a private broadcaster). 
166 438 U.S. 265, 313 (1978). 
167 Id. at 312 (quoting Keyishian v. Bd. of Regents, 385 U.S. 589, 603 (1967)). 
168 Fagundes, supra note 116, at 1646. 
169 See Norton, supra note 120, at 423 n.16 (characterizing Justice Stevens’s dissent as “urging 
the Court to recognize public libraries as First Amendment rightsholders”). 
170 Yudof, supra note 13, at 869. 
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assert similar protections against state restriction. The question of whether 
states can assert First Amendment rights against the federal government is 
“at least reasonably open.”171 There are structural and originalist arguments to 
be made that states should receive the protections enumerated in the Bill of 
Rights, including the Free Speech Clause.172 And it seems clear that the CBS 
principle’s per se bar against government speech receiving First Amendment 
protection “fails to account for a scenario in which the federal government 
wrongly attempts to restrict the speech of another sovereign.”173 As sovereign 
entities, it is commonsensical that states would not be restricted in their 
expression by federal government regulation, and that such protection would 
come from the First Amendment. If Hunter is not substantively incorporated 
into the First Amendment,174 then municipal governments are independent 
from state governments for the purposes of First Amendment challenges, and 
should be able to possess and assert speech rights against restrictions set by 
state legislatures just as state governments can assert such protections against 
restrictions set by the federal legislature. 
While a full account of the Court’s government speech doctrine is not a 
goal of this Comment, the preceding survey demonstrates that the questions 
purportedly answered by CBS are far from settled. While the Court has 
affirmed that government speech is insulated from First Amendment 
challenges in cases like Walker and Summum, government speech can still be 
protected under the Free Speech Clause since that question was reserved in 
American Library Ass’n. Additionally, such protection is possible while also 
preserving the ability of government to function as an unrestricted 
communicator. Much of the recent scholarship dealing with the government 
speech issue is focused on how government speech is unrestricted by the First 
Amendment.175 However, comparatively little discussion has been devoted in 
recent years to whether CBS’s dicta that government speech is without protection 
under the Free Speech Clause should remain undisturbed and jurisprudentially 
unexamined.176 The next Part answers that question affirmatively and details how 
 
171 Roosevelt, supra note 165. 
172 Porterfield, supra note 151, at 24 (arguing the states “were actually intended, along with 
individuals, to be beneficiaries of the amendments”). 
173 Fagundes, supra note 116, at 1662. 
174 See discussion of Hunter’s substantive doctrine, supra Section I.D. 
175 See Rhodes, supra note 125, at 418 (arguing against the premise that government speech 
should be exempt from First Amendment restrictions because it gives the Court “freewheeling 
authority to declare new categories of speech outside the scope of the First Amendment” (quoting 
United States v. Stevens, 559 U.S. 460, 472 (2010))). 
176 See id. at 421 (“The current doctrinal significance of government speech is not creating a 
free speech right that the government can assert against itself, but instead providing the government 
a defense to a First Amendment claim . . . .” (citation omitted)). 
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protecting government speech—or at least the speech of local governments—fits 
logically into First Amendment jurisprudence. 
III. PROTECTING GOVERNMENT SPEECH UNDER  
THE FIRST AMENDMENT 
This Part argues for extending First Amendment protections to speech 
by local government entities. First, this Part briefly describes how municipal 
speech fits logically into the First Amendment framework due to the Free 
Speech Clause’s object neutrality. Second, this Part argues that while 
individual autonomy is “an important First Amendment value,” it is not “the 
only First Amendment value.”177 Precedent and scholars alike suggest that 
societal interests in the value of uninhibited speech are a primary focus of 
First Amendment protections. Finally, this Part contends that government 
speech furthers these societal interests and that municipal speech serves these 
interests far better than speech by higher levels of government. 
A. A Brief Word About the Object-Neutral First Amendment 
Opponents of protecting government speech under the First Amendment 
argue there is an incoherence in granting government speech the protection 
of the First Amendment. Their argument asserts that since the text of the 
First Amendment limits the government’s ability to abridge speech, to make 
government a recipient of that protection would prevent it from restricting 
its own speech.178 This incoherence is revealed to be largely semantic and 
superficial when one considers government restrictions on the speech of other 
governmental bodies. It is just as obviously false to argue that because the 
text of the First Amendment only prohibits Congress from abridging speech, 
other governmental bodies are free to do so. Just as precedent has expanded 
the reach of the First Amendment to actions by states, courts, and agencies,179 
precedent also makes clear that it is the nature of the speech, and not the 
 
177 See Fagundes, supra note 116, at 1662. 
178 See Matal v. Tam, 137 S. Ct. 1744, 1757 (2017) (“[T]he First Amendment does not say that 
Congress and other government entities must abridge their own ability to speak freely.”); 
Bezanson & Buss, supra note 119, at 1501 (arguing against categorizing the government as a First 
Amendment speaker because granting speech protections to government speech would protect it 
from its own restrictions). 
179 Seth F. Kreimer, Pervasive Image Capture and the First Amendment: Memory, Discourse, and 
the Right to Record, 159 U. PA. L. REV. 335, 371 (2011) (“In First Amendment doctrine, narrow parsing 
of the words of the Amendment has not determined its reach. By its terms, the Amendment binds 
only Congress. Yet the First Amendment applies to actions of the federal executive and judiciary, 
and the First Amendment constrains the states not by virtue of its text, but because of incorporation 
through the due process clause.”). 
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speaker, which determines protection.180 This recognition is vital to protecting 
government speech. As one scholar put it, “[o]nly if the First Amendment can 
be loosed from individual liberty can government speech be seen as speech 
directly protected with all other speech under the First Amendment.”181 
The text of the First Amendment offers a basic foundation for the 
argument that an individual speaker’s freedom to speak is not the sole object 
of protection. The First Amendment is unique among the Bill of Rights in that it 
does not state who possesses the right it enshrines.182 The text reads “Congress shall 
make no law . . . abridging the freedom of speech.”183 This brief clause “does not 
identify any limitations on the identities of the speakers on whom [its] safeguard is 
bestowed.”184 Further, because the other amendments in the Bill of Rights do 
specify a recipient of their protections, canons of construction suggest the 
difference was purposeful and should be read with a different meaning.185 
However, precedents under the Fourteenth Amendment’s Due Process 
Clause offer interpretations that bear more directly on the question than does 
the First Amendment’s text alone. While the First Amendment’s object-
neutrality has been a basis for the Court to hold some speech to be protected 
despite the nature of particular speakers,186 cases expanding protection to 
speech based on its effect rather than the speaker’s nature are much more 
important to understanding how the speech protections are applied than the 
bare bones of the Amendment’s text. 
While the dominant interpretation of the First Amendment is as a 
protection of the individual’s right to speak,187 individual autonomy is not the 
 
180 See Citizens United v. Fed. Election Comm’n, 558 U.S. 310, 315 (2010) (“Government may 
not suppress political speech on the basis of the speaker’s corporate identity. No sufficient 
governmental interest justifies limits on the political speech of nonprofit or for-profit 
corporations.”); Pacific Gas Elec. Co. v. Public Util. Comm’n of Cal., 475 U.S. 1, 8 (1986) (“The 
identity of the speaker is not decisive in determining whether speech is protected.”); First Nat’l 
Bank of Bos. v. Bellotti, 435 U.S. 765, 776 (1978) (“[T]he proper question . . . is not whether 
corporations ‘have’ First Amendment rights,” but whether the state ban on corporate expenditures 
“abridges expression that the First Amendment was meant to protect.”). 
181 Bezanson & Buss, supra note 119, at 1503-04. 
182 See Bendor, supra note 23, at 426 (arguing under Citizens United that “[s]peech in association 
is protected like individual speech. Municipalities are sites of association, often more so than 
corporations” (citation omitted)). 
183 U.S. CONST. amend. I. 
184 Fagundes, supra note 116, at 1648. 
185 See Porterfield, supra note 151, at 32 (arguing that the First Amendment protects states and 
localities because while some rights under the Bill of Rights have been explicitly construed as “purely 
personal,” the Court has resisted restricting speech protections to individuals based on their identity). 
186 See, e.g., Citizens United v. Fed. Election Comm’n, 558 U.S. 310, 319 (2010) (considering 
the free speech rights of a non-profit corporation); Pacific Gas Elec. Co. v. Pub. Util. Comm’n of Cal., 
475 U.S. 1, 4 (1986) (considering the free speech rights of a public utility company); First Nat’l Bank of 
Bos. v. Bellotti, 435 U.S. 765, 776-84 (1978) (considering the free speech rights of a corporation). 
187 See Fagundes, supra note 116, at 1660 (“[T]he notion that the clause should be understood 
largely as a bulwark of personal autonomy against state suppression has become a dominant—if not 
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only purpose of the First Amendment.188 The First Amendment protects 
“‘significant societal interests’ wholly apart from the speaker’s interest in self-
expression.”189 Most often, this structural value is framed as the public’s 
interest in a diverse and unrestricted marketplace of ideas.190 Its value and 
importance derive from its “instrumental value . . . in a democratic society.”191 
The value of a free market of ideas is that it allows the citizenry to debate 
issues of public importance in order to thresh the chaff of bad ideas from the 
process of self-government.192 On this theory, protecting free and open 
discussion is fundamental to making republican government responsive to the 
 
the dominant—interpretive approach . . . .”); id. at 1649 (describing one view of object neutrality 
that “the First Amendment should be understood as a safeguard that applies to an artifact (speech) 
rather than an actor (speakers)”). 
188 See Citizens United, 558 U.S. at 341 (“The First Amendment protects speech and speaker, 
and the ideas that flow from each.”). 
189 Pacific Gas, 475 U.S. at 8 (quoting Bellotti, 435 U.S. at 776) (“The constitutional guarantee 
of free speech ‘serves significant societal interests’ wholly apart from the speaker’s interest in self-
expression.”); see also Bellotti, 435 U.S. at 776 (“The Constitution often protects interests broader 
than those of the party seeking their vindication. The First Amendment, in particular, serves 
significant societal interests.”); id. at 777 n.12 (“The individual’s interest in self-expression is a 
concern of the First Amendment separate from the concern for open and informed discussion, 
although the two often converge.”); Fagundes, supra note 116, at 1662 (“cases [like Red Lion Broadcast. 
Co. v. FCC and Lamont v. Postmaster Gen. belay] the assertion that the sole purpose of the First 
Amendment is to protect individual autonomy.”); Porterfield, supra note 151, at 32 (“[T]he central 
function of the First Amendment is not to preserve individual rights, but to protect our democratic 
society by permitting the free discussion and debate of issues of public concern.”). 
190 See Bellotti, 435 U.S. at 783 (“[O]ur recent commercial speech cases . . . illustrate that the 
First Amendment goes beyond protection of the press and the self-expression of individuals to 
prohibit the government from limiting the stock of information from which members of the public 
may draw.”); Red Lion Broad. Co. v. Fed. Commc’ns Comm’n, 395 U.S. 367, 390 (1969) (holding 
that the First Amendment is meant to promote a marketplace of ideas where truth will prevail). 
191 Note, The Constitutionality of Municipal Advocacy, supra note 12, at 544 (“The [F]irst 
[A]mendment recognizes not only the intrinsic value of speech in defining individual and group 
identity, but also the instrumental value of speech in a democratic society. By recognizing the special 
value of political speech, the [F]irst [A]mendment seeks both to protect the flow of information in 
the marketplace of ideas and to preserve private control of political discussion.”). 
192 See Red Lion Broad. Co, 395 U.S. at 389-90 (“[I]t is the purpose of the First Amendment to 
preserve an uninhibited marketplace of ideas in which truth will ultimately prevail.”); see also Mills 
v. Alabama, 384 U.S. 214, 218-19 (1966) (“[T]here is practically universal agreement that a major 
purpose of the First Amendment was to protect the free discussion of governmental affairs” which 
includes “the manner in which government is operated or should be operated, and all such matters 
relating to political processes.”); Lamont v. Postmaster Gen., 381 U.S. 301, 307 (1965) (striking down 
a state regulation of propaganda sent through the mail because it was “at war with the ‘uninhibited, 
robust, and wide-open’ debate and discussion that are contemplated by the First Amendment” 
(quoting N.Y. Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 270 (1964))); Roth v. United States, 354 U.S. 476, 
484 (1957) (arguing that the First Amendment “was fashioned to assure unfettered interchange of 
ideas for the bringing about of political and social changes desired by the people”). 
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will of the people since that will can hardly be determined in the absence of 
informed public comment.193 
In Citizens United v. Federal Election Commission, the Court recognized that 
“it is inherent in the nature of the political process that voters must be free 
to obtain information from diverse sources in order to determine how to cast 
their votes.”194 To that end, the Court held that it is the right of the public 
“to determine for itself what speech and speakers are worthy of 
consideration.”195 In order to protect that right, the First Amendment has 
been held to embody “a profound national commitment to the principle that 
debate on public issues should be uninhibited, robust, and wide-open.”196 
Unrestricted access to the marketplace of ideas for a rich diversity of speakers 
is a foundational principle of the structural interest.197 The importance of this 
principle persuaded the Court to protect expressive contributions emanating 
from corporations and associations,198 presumably because such institutions 
have speech of value to add to the discussion of government affairs. Protecting 
diversity of thought through prohibitions on content and viewpoint 
discrimination has been held to be just as vital as preserving a diversity of 
speakers.199 If government speech advances a marketplace of ideas by 
 
193 See Citizens United, 558 U.S. at 339 (“The right of citizens to inquire, to hear, to speak, and 
to use information to reach consensus is a precondition to enlightened self-government and a 
necessary means to protect it.”); Thornhill v. Alabama, 310 U.S. 88, 102 (1940) (“Freedom of 
discussion, if it would fulfill its historic function in this nation, must embrace all issues about which 
information is needed or appropriate to enable the members of society to cope with the exigencies 
of their period.”); Stromberg v. California, 283 U.S. 359, 369 (1931) (“The maintenance of the 
opportunity for free political discussion to the end that government may be responsive to the will 
of the people and that changes may be obtained by lawful means, an opportunity essential to the 
security of the Republic, is a fundamental principle of our constitutional system.”); Yudof, supra note 
13, at 872 (noting that society’s interest in a free flow of information is inferable from an uninhibited 
flow being a necessary premise of “democratic processes, majority rule, the verification of consent, 
and . . . self-governing speech”). 
194 Citizens United, 558 U.S. at 341. 
195 Id. 
196 Sullivan, 376 U.S. at 270; see also Note, The Rights of the Public and the Press to Gather 
Information, 87 HARV. L. REV. 1505, 1505 (1974) (“[P]rotection of the free flow of information [is] a 
basic objective of the [F]irst [A]mendment.”). 
197 See Pacific Gas Elec. Co. v. Pub. Util. Comm’n of Cal., 475 U.S. 1, 8 (1986) (“[T]he critical 
considerations [in Bellotti and Consolidated Edison Co.] were that the State sought to abridge speech 
that the First Amendment is designed to protect, and that such prohibitions limited the range of 
information and ideas to which the public is exposed.”). 
198 See Yudof, supra note 13, at 872 (“So important are these values [of preserving the free flow 
of information for the democratic process] that courts have protected the expression of private 
institutions such as unions and corporations.”). 
199 See, e.g., Reed v. Town of Gilbert, 135 S. Ct. 2218, 2238 (2015) (noting subject-matter 
restrictions that are viewpoint-neutral on their face can still be unconstitutional); McCullen v. 
Coakley, 134 S. Ct. 2518, 2533 (2014) (citing Bellotti for the proposition that a legislative attempt to 
give one side of a debate an advantage is unconstitutional); First Nat’l Bank of Bos. v. Bellotti, 435 
U.S. 765, 785-86 (1978) (“[W]here . . . the legislature’s suppression of speech suggests an attempt to 
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contributing to a robust exchange with unique expressive content, then its 
protection is consistent with the purposes of the First Amendment.200 
Additionally, if government speech advances the marketplace in significant 
and irreplaceable ways, perhaps protection is not only consistent with the 
First Amendment, but required by it. 
B. Government Speech Furthers First Amendment Values 
Government speech “serve[s] a functional purpose within the system of 
freedom of expression.”201 In fact, it serves three such purposes. First, 
government speech presents the public with information relevant to matters 
of self-government, which is within the government’s sole possession. Second, 
government speech provides a balancing force in public debate for minorities and 
individuals struggling to communicate ideas in fora dominated by collective 
expression. Finally, government speech increases government transparency, 
particularly when separate governmental bodies speak to check one another. 
Whether they are press releases, reports, or tweets,202 government 
expressions frequently present a unique point of view and unique 
information.203 As Bezanson observes, “Government adds another voice to 
the marketplace of ideas, and thus furthers one of the important reasons for 
protecting speech freedom. The marketplace of ideas is patently worse off 
when government information . . . is kept away from the citizens of a 
democracy.”204 Sometimes, this information is in the sole possession of the 
government, which concerns the affairs and function of government bodies 
or officials.205 Such information may be of irreplaceable value in public debate 
 
give one side of a debatable public question an advantage in expressing its views to the people, the 
First Amendment is plainly offended.”). 
200 See Yudof, supra note 13, at 871 (stating that there is a strong collective interest in having the 
government participate in communication networks, but concluding that this only militates against the strong 
First Amendment rights of private speakers to restrain government expression). 
201 YUDOF, supra note 113, at 43. 
202 See, e.g., NASA (@NASA), TWITTER (Feb. 22, 2017, 9:20 AM), https://twitter.com/
nasa/status/834452802474823681?lang=en [https://perma.cc/Q4LM-NPEA] (“Pssst! We’ve got 
exciting news from beyond our solar system! Spoiler: NOT aliens. Watch at 1pm ET: nasa.gov/live Q? 
Use #askNASA.”). 
203 See YUDOF, supra note 113, at 40 (“Government is also a major source of information, which 
it is sometimes uniquely fitted to acquire and disseminate.”); id. at 46 (noting that governments are 
sometimes “virtually the only entities with resources willing to present a particular side of a public 
issue”); Fagundes, supra note 116, at 1640 (noting that government speech can publicize an 
“unrecognized point of view on a matter of public concern”); Norton, supra note 121, at 215 
(“[Government] expression . . . provides a valuable heuristic for those who do not have the time or 
expertise to evaluate competing policy arguments for themselves . . . .”). 
204 Bezanson & Buss, supra note 119, at 1474. 
205 See Mills v. Alabama, 384 U.S. 214, 218-19 (1966) (“[T]here is practically universal 
agreement that a major purpose of that Amendment was to protect the free discussion of governmental 
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because it is necessary for the valid exercise of self-government206 since it 
concerns government’s “internal workings, operations, and policies.”207 
Therefore, government speech may be necessary for the public “to identify 
their government’s priorities (and thus to evaluate its performance).”208 
PWBC data are clearly information within the sole control of the government, 
collectable only by the government, and particularly vital to debate over how 
government should be run.209 Access to the information held by the police 
themselves is highly credible, and the “more credible the information,” “the more 
credible are the debates.”210 These debates can be determinative in the process of 
self-government, making PWBC data disclosure a compelling example of 
government speech that advances the societal interests protected by the First 
Amendment.211 
Government speech also amplifies “voices that might not otherwise be 
audible.”212 Amplifying the message of minority speakers is a recognized 
 
affairs” which includes “the manner in which government is operated or should be operated, and all such 
matters relating to political processes.” (emphasis added)). 
206 See Rotunda & Nowak, supra note 119, at 64 (“Undoubtedly there is a valid public interest, 
and First Amendment value, in the government conveyance to the public of information regarding 
government programs. Governmental activities . . . provide the basis for the discussion and debate 
of self-governance issues which have been a touchstone value in the First Amendment analysis.”); 
see also YUDOF, supra note 113, at 40 (“The failure of government to disclose facts, particularly facts 
about its own operations, is destructive of informed, democratic processes.”); James A. Goldston et 
al., A Nation Less Secure: Diminished Public Access to Information, 21 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 409, 
444 n.177 (1986) (arguing that government secrecy in espionage cases can “result in the permanent 
loss of information critical to public debate”); Yudof, supra note 13, at 864 (“Government secrecy 
may make informed debate impossible”); id. at 865 (“Government expression is critical to the 
operation of a democratic polity”); id. at 866 (“[C]ommunications emanating from [local 
government] do provide information necessary to the exercise of the citizenry’s judgment about 
political issues and candidates.”). 
207 Note, The Rights of the Public and the Press to Gather Information, supra note 196, at 1510. 
208 Norton, supra note 120, at 421; see also Garrison v. Louisiana, 379 U.S. 64, 77 (1964) (noting 
the “paramount public interest in a free flow of information to the people concerning public officials, 
their servants”). 
209 Fields v. City of Phila., 862 F.3d 353, 359 (3d Cir. 2017) (characterizing access to 
information regarding police activity as vital to public discourse and therefore occupying “the 
highest rung of the hierarchy of First Amendment values”). 
210 Id. 
211 See id. at 358 (“[O]bservation, recording, and sharing of police activity has contributed 
greatly to our national discussion of proper policing.”). However, premising protections for 
government speech entirely on the public’s need to know about government-held information may 
have consequences going much further than ensuring access to information necessary to self-
governance. A government may put its expressive capacity to ends other than informing the 
electorate. Cf. YUDOF, supra note 113, at 47 (“But this is a far cry from bootstrapping from the ‘right 
to know’ to what is tantamount to a recognition of a constitutional right on the part of governments 
to engage in extensive communications activities.”). 
212 Creek v. Village of Westhaven, 80 F.3d 186, 193 (7th Cir. 1996) (Posner, J., concurring); see 
also YUDOF, supra note 113, at 40 (“In all of its efforts, government may be said to be expanding 
choice and reinforcing personal autonomy.”). 
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benefit of associations under the First Amendment.213 This is particularly true 
for local governments because their speech can amplify the views of a 
concentrated group of citizens with a unified interest in local concerns.214 
Amplification is especially vital in an age when corporations and other interest 
groups wield such large megaphones.215 While technological innovations have 
lowered the entry barrier for speakers in the marketplace of ideas and have 
permitted spreading a message widely, organizations and corporations with vast 
resources and large followings across platforms still have an advantage in public 
debates.216 However, extending protections to government speech because it has 
the ability to amplify voices may be an overinclusive remedy.217 
A final functional purpose that government speech serves is to increase 
government accountability. By creating transparency in government affairs, 
such speech provides a check against legislative self-dealing and thereby 
makes the legislature more responsive to the electorate.218 This function is 
particularly persuasive in the context of intergovernmental situations. 
Governments of different sizes and constituencies represent groups with 
different interests, interests which may not be aligned between state and 
federal governments, or state and local governments. Misaligned interests 
provide an incentive for local governments to function as a check against the 
efforts of larger governmental bodies to self-deal. As a consequence, local 
 
213 See NAACP v. Alabama ex rel. Patterson, 357 U.S. 449, 460 (1958) (“Effective advocacy of 
both public and private points of view, particularly controversial ones, is undeniably enhanced by 
group association, as this Court has more than once recognized by remarking upon the close nexus 
between the freedoms of speech and assembly.”). 
214 See Creek, 80 F.3d at 193 (Posner, J., concurring) (“To the extent . . . that a municipality is 
the voice of its residents—is, indeed, a megaphone amplifying voices that might not otherwise be 
audible—a curtailment of [the] right to speak might be thought a curtailment of the unquestioned 
First Amendment rights of those residents.”). 
215 See Yudof, supra note 13, at 866 (“Government speech can amplify the voices of individuals 
attempting to participate in debates dominated by the press, corporations, and other large, organized 
interest groups.”). 
216 See Greene, supra note 162, at 354 (“Some state speech fills gaps in the marketplace of ideas, 
supplementing private speech that might be skewed toward profit or other not publicly regarding 
ends.”); Norton, supra note 121, at 215 (noting that government speech “adds to the marketplace of 
available ideas and arguments, especially (but not only) as a counter to less [accountable and 
nontransparent] expression from powerful, private sources”). 
217 See YUDOF, supra note 113, at 45 (“It would be standing the world on its head to think that the 
extension of First Amendment rights to private sector organizations requires a constitutionalization of 
government expression in order to counter the distortions brought about by such private institutions.”). 
Protected government speech could be put to other, more harmful uses which may outweigh the benefit 
of amplifying minority speech. See infra note 238 and accompanying text. 
218 See Fagundes, supra note 116, at 1655 (discussing Hamilton’s argument that state legislatures 
counteract legislative self-dealing); Norton, supra note 121, at 215 (stating that Government 
“expression enhances political accountability by informing voters of their government’s priorities 
and preferences”); Fan, supra note 1, at 407 (body cameras “are mechanisms of control by the people 
using transparency to check power holders”). 
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governments are motivated to speak out against centralized power grabs or 
unconstitutional action.219 Government speech provides the publicity 
necessary to prevent self-dealing by governmental bodies with interests 
contrary to local electorates.220 Protecting government speech under the First 
Amendment from efforts to prevent it serving this function would 
significantly advance the interests of the First Amendment in preserving 
public debate capable of informing the process of self-government. 
The current failure to analyze government speech under a First 
Amendment framework has itself harmed free expression. Because 
government speech is currently exempt from speech restrictions, any speech 
attributable to the government escapes First Amendment scrutiny. This 
impedes a diverse and vibrant marketplace of ideas since quite a lot of speech 
is potentially attributable to the government221 and thus subject to this 
loophole in speech protections.222 In dicta in Matal v. Tam, the Court opined 
upon the importance of the government-speech doctrine’s allowance for 
viewpoint discriminatory speech, while cautioning against its overuse.223 The 
Court worried about the potential for government to “silence or muffle the 
expression of disfavored viewpoints” by labeling private expression as 
government approved, and counseled “great caution” when extending 
government-speech precedents.224 
While the aforementioned benefits do suggest government speech is 
legitimately beneficial to free expression, Mark Yudof noted as early as 1980 
that this does not lead to the inevitable conclusion that government speech 
 
219 See, e.g., James Madison, Virginia Resolutions of 1798, reprinted in The Debates in the 
Several State Conventions on the Adoption of the Federal Constitution 528 (Jonathan Elliot ed., 
2nd ed. 1836) (opposing the Sedition Act); Thomas Jefferson, Kentucky Resolutions of 1798 and 
1799, reprinted in The Debates in the Several State Conventions on the Adoption of the Federal 
Constitution 540 (Jonathan Elliot ed., 2nd ed. 1836) (same). 
220 See Richmond Newspapers Inc. v. Virginia, 448 U.S. 555, 569 (1980) (“Without publicity, 
all other checks are insufficient: in comparison [to] publicity, all other checks are of small account.”). 
221 See, e.g., Walker v. Tex. Div., Sons of Confederate Veterans, Inc., 135 S. Ct. 2239 (2015) 
(stating that the rejection of a license plate design featuring the Confederate flag by government 
was not a free speech violation); Pleasant Grove City v. Summum, 555 U.S. 460, 460 (2009) (holding 
“placement of a permanent monument in a public park is a form of government speech and therefore 
not subject to scrutiny under the Free Speech Clause”). 
222 See Steven G. Gey, Why Should the First Amendment Protect Government Speech when the 
Government has Nothing to Say, 95 IOWA L. REV. 1259, 1313 (2010) (stating “the government speech 
doctrine is about using the government’s speech as an excuse to circumvent other constitutional 
rules, such as those protecting private speech, restricting the government’s religious activities, or 
structuring the government’s ability to prosecute individuals for criminal activities”). However, it 
should be noted that this is a criticism of government speech being exempt from First Amendment 
restriction rather than not receiving protection. 
223 Matal v. Tam, 137 S. Ct. 1744, 1758 (2017) (“[W]hile the government-speech doctrine is 
important—indeed, essential—it is a doctrine that is susceptible to dangerous misuse.”). 
224 Id. 
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should be protected under the First Amendment.225 While clearly a “primary 
means of protecting and enhancing democratic values,”226 Yudof noted that it 
was “inconceivable that governments should assert First Amendment rights 
antagonistic to the interests of the larger community.”227 As previously noted, 
protecting government speech grants it protection for expressions that can do more 
than bring the above benefits to a system of free expression. A fully theorized 
doctrine protecting government speech cannot stand without taking account of the 
ways in which it might harm “the interests of the larger community.”228 
C. Purported Harms Done to First Amendment Values  
by Government Speech 
Critics of protecting government speech under the First Amendment 
offer several policy reasons explaining why it threatens a system of free 
expression. First, critics note that governments are so large and well 
positioned in the communication industry that they are not in need of speech 
protections. Second, governments are said to distort public debate. Third, 
government is said to crowd out other speakers by virtue of its unique 
authority. Finally, government’s unique nature as an entity which serves by 
the consent of the governed is said to be undermined by allowing those who 
govern to shape and perhaps falsify the consent of the public. Each of these 
will be presented and rejected in turn as unpersuasive grounds for excluding 
government speech from First Amendment protection without exception. 
Critics argue that “[g]overnments, particularly the federal government, 
are not fledgling communicators, needing protection from community’s 
excesses.”229 Indeed, speech by the federal government does not go unnoticed. 
However, while not fledgling communicators in the same way as street corner 
protesters, municipalities are of limited size and power compared to their 
state governments. What resources they do have are certainly no greater than 
those wielded by corporate speakers. And it is well established that being an 
entity with greater resources and communicative power than the average 
citizen does not disqualify a speaker from protection, as the corporate speech 
doctrine recognizes.230 Municipal corporations stand in an analogous relation 
 
225 See YUDOF, supra note 113, at 41. 
226 Id. 
227 Id. at 45. 
228 Id. 
229 Id. 
230 See Citizens United v. Fed. Election Comm’n, 558 U.S. 310, 314 (2010) (“It is irrelevant for 
First Amendment purposes that corporate funds may ‘have little or no correlation to the public’s 
support for the corporation’s political ideas’ . . . . All speakers, including individuals and the media, 
use money amassed from the economic marketplace to fund their speech, and the First Amendment 
protects the resulting speech.”). 
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to their state and federal governments, as do private corporations when it 
comes to the sophistication and strength of their expression, and they should 
be treated analogously as a result. The mere fact of their size no more 
disqualifies municipalities from speech protection than it does corporations. 
The restrictions on disclosure of PWBC data are evidence of the need for 
protecting municipal speech as well. 
Particularly in relation to the federal or state governmental bodies which 
may currently exert control over their speech, municipalities do in fact need 
protected expression. This is contrary to Yudof ’s assertion that “emasculation 
by state or federal courts of the government’s power to communicate, or self-
emasculation of these powers by other branches of government, is unlikely.”231 
Perhaps Yudof was not considering the possibility of intergovernmental free 
speech claims, and he certainly incorporated Hunter’s doctrine of local 
powerlessness into his cursory analysis of this particular issue.232 If Hunter 
allows for local governments to challenge state restrictions on their speech, 
restrictions like those on the release of PWBC data are not self-emasculation 
by legislatures, but potentially First Amendment–violative prior restraints. 
Yudof also argued that “all government decisions involve hierarchies of 
authority” and “[i]t is inconceivable that the commands of those at the top . . . 
should be countermanded by the courts.”233 He goes on to state that “[w]hile 
differences in degree may exist, local governments are as much creatures of the 
state as federal administrative agencies are creatures of Congress.”234 
To equate a city’s relationship to its state with the executive branch’s 
relationship to the legislative branch of the same body of government is to deny 
the independence many states give their cities. This overly simplistic analogy 
incorporates the unexamined fallacy of the Hunter doctrine to the detriment 
of the First Amendment speech interests of cities and citizens alike. If state 
and local governments are indeed separate First Amendment speakers,235 
then Yudof ’s appeal to the hierarchical control analogy of government officers 
does not track because localities are not subservient subdivisions for speech 
purposes. Indeed, Yudof admits there is a stronger case for protecting 
government speech if the federal government were forbidding state or local 
government expression.236 While he concludes federalism makes it 
 
231 YUDOF, supra note 113, at 45. 
232 Yudof, supra note 13, at 870 (“[L]ocal governments are as much creatures of the state as 
federal administrative agencies are creatures of Congress.”). 
233 Id. at 868 n.18. 
234 Id. at 870. 
235 See infra Section IV.C. 
236 See Yudof, supra note 13, at 868 n.18 (“A rights approach may be appealing if one branch of 
government were to forbid another branch to engage in communication activities, or if the federal 
government were to forbid state or local governments from engaging in certain sorts of 
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unnecessary to “distort[] . . . the First Amendment” to deal with that issue,237 
federalism does not prevent a state from forbidding local government 
expression. Municipal speech rights are necessary to that end, as state laws 
restricting the release of PWBC data evince. 
Government speech is said to harm public debate because it is so powerful 
that it distorts the citizenry’s judgment on issues.238 The Court addressed this 
argument first in Bellotti when it rejected a discussion-domination 
justification for excluding corporate speech from First Amendment 
protection for lack of an evidentiary showing that there was a present threat 
of corporations dominating political discussion.239 The Court rejected the 
anti-distortion justification for exclusion from the marketplace more squarely 
in Citizens United.240 The prior case of Austin v. Michigan Chamber of Commerce 
had upheld a restriction of corporate speech on the anti-distortion rationale, 
stating corporate speech had a unique ability to harm the marketplace of 
ideas.241 In Citizens United, the Court explicitly overruled that justification, 
finding “the antidistortion interest recognized in Austin . . . unconvincing and 
insufficient.”242 Government speech is no more distorting than corporate 
speech, and municipal speech in particular has not nearly the distorting effect 
of large national corporations. It is anathema to a system of free expression 
that a speaker should be excluded from the marketplace of ideas because it 
poses a risk of distorting the public’s view of an issue. The romantic ideal of 
the First Amendment is that false or harmful speech is best countered by 
more speech, that through the process of debate the truth will win out:243 
“[T]he fear that speech might persuade provides no lawful basis for quieting 
it.”244 This logic has permitted protected access to the marketplace of ideas 
for corporate speakers, and should do so for government speakers as well, 
particularly since powerful private speakers like corporations can balance the 
weight of government speech. 
 
expression.”); see also Fagundes, supra note 116, at 1668 (arguing that allowing the federal government to 
“dictate content” presented by state agencies “would impoverish public debate”). 
237 Yudof, supra note 13, at 868 n.18. 
238 See id. at 865 (“The power to teach, inform, and lead is also the power to indoctrinate, 
distort judgment, and perpetuate the current regime.” (emphasis added)). 
239 See Note, The Constitutionality of Municipal Advocacy, supra note 12, at 541 n.39 (noting the 
Bellotti Court denied there was a compelling interest in protecting the political process from the 
domination of corporations). 
240 See Citizens United v. Fed. Election Comm’n, 558 U.S. 310, 349 (2010) (holding that the 
antidistortion rationale “cannot be reconciled with the confidence and stability in civic discourse 
that the First Amendment must secure”). 
241 494 U.S. 652 (1990). 
242 558 U.S. at 366. 
243 See United States v. Alvarez, 567 U.S. 709, 132 S. Ct. 2537, 2550 (2012) (“The remedy for 
speech that is false is speech that is true.”). 
244 Sorrell v. IMS Health Inc., 564 U.S. 552, 576 (2011). 
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Government expression is also said to put private control of political 
discussion at risk by crowding out other speakers.245 Control of political 
debate is supposed to remain with the polity in a system of free expression.246 
If the system is strengthened by increasing pluralism, some critics claim the 
system is harmed by adding speakers who dominate discussion and reduce 
the participation of the plurality.247 This is closely related to the concern that 
government speakers are not representing the interests of their constituents 
when they speak, but are instead intending to sway constituents to their 
view.248 Such a concern is just as quickly dispatched for the same reason as 
was the concern that government speech distorts public discussion. The 
marketplace functions to weed out bad or false ideas by the process of more 
speech. Furthermore, it would be arbitrary to allow corporations of 
comparable size and “volume” to dominate public debate while prohibiting 
government speech on the rationale that it would do the same. While the 
issue of crowding out may have intuitive appeal, the argument does not 
differentiate between government and corporate speakers. 
Yet another related line of argument is the scholarly worry that 
government speech has the potential to undermine the validity of 
government’s own authority as it is derived from the will of the sovereign 
people. The crux of the argument is that government expression may 
influence the citizenry’s expression of its political preferences, perhaps 
intentionally.249 Critics claim that if government is permitted to introduce 
information selectively into the marketplace of ideas, it could manipulate the 
public into consenting to whatever policy it wished.250 This argument is 
 
245 See Steven Shiffrin, Government Speech, 27 UCLA L. REV. 565, 595 (1980) (describing the 
danger of government speech drowning out political minorities, but also noting that Bellotti allows 
corporations to pose just as much of a threat); Yudof, supra note 13, at 865 (stating “the power of 
governments to communicate is also the power to destroy the underpinnings of government by 
consent); Greene, supra note 162, at 356 (reasoning “if the state were to monopolize a market for a 
certain type of speech, the virtues of the state as offering just one point of view in a public debate 
would diminish or be eliminated”). 
246 See Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 57 (1976) (“In the free society ordained by our Constitution it is not 
the government, but the people—individually as citizens . . . and collectively as associations . . .—who must 
retain control over the quantity and range of debate on public issues in a political campaign.”). 
247 See Yudof, supra note 13, at 873 (stating “[t]he greatest threat to the system of freedom of 
expression emanates from the welfare state”). 
248 See YUDOF, supra note 113, at 49 (worrying that “municipal governments may be expressing 
the views of public officials who are attempting to create a majority, and not representing a majority 
in . . . pending policy debates”). 
249 See id. at 201 (fearing government will “engineer consent to its policies”). 
250 See id. at 40 (“The failure of government to disclose facts, particularly facts about its own 
operations, is destructive of informed, democratic processes.”); Bezanson & Buss, supra note 119, at 1474 
(“[S]elective introduction of information into the marketplace by government would seem to enable the 
government to manipulate and undermine the decision-making role that citizens must ultimately be free 
to perform.”); Goldston et al., supra note 206, at 444 n.177 (arguing government secrecy in espionage cases 
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particularly pointed where it concerns information about the operation of 
government absolutely necessary for informed debate about self-government 
to occur, like video of police procedures.251 This is especially true when the 
information is under the sole control of the government.252 
This concern is similar to concerns of crowding out smaller speakers and 
distorting public debate and should be dismissed for similar reasons. The 
anti-distortion justification was rejected by the Court in Citizens United as a 
reason for excluding corporate speakers from protection. And while a 
government’s unique interest in ensuring the validity of public policy 
preferences distinguishes it from corporate speakers,253 the effect of its speech 
on those preferences is no more damaging to public preference validity 
simply due to that conflict of interest. 
Because the concerns about government speech have either been rejected 
by the Court, as the anti-distortion concern was in Citizens United, or fail to 
bear out in the absence of Hunter’s local powerlessness doctrine, the benefits 
of government speech to a system of free expression counsel for its 
protection. However, such a conclusion is not necessary for the purposes of 
this Comment. For municipal free speech claims to be viable against the 
state’s restriction of PWBC data disclosure, the court need only protect local 
government speech, not the speech of every government entity. While some 
scholars voice concern that any government speech protection begins the 
inevitable slide down the slippery slope to universal protection for all 
government speakers,254 the following Section makes the case that local 
 
can “result in the permanent loss of information critical to public debate”); Norton, supra note 120, at 421 
(“[G]overnment speech both informs members of the public on a wide range of topics and enables them 
to identify their government’s priorities (and thus to evaluate its performance).”); Yudof, supra note 13, at 
864 (“Government secrecy may make informed debate impossible . . . .”). 
251 The Court recognized that consent to government activities could not be valid without 
access to government-held “information and other prerequisites for the exercise of the citizen’s 
judgment about political issues and candidates.” YUDOF, supra note 113, at 43 (discussing Buckley v. 
Valeo, 424 U.S. 1 (1976)); see also id. at 247 (“Facts about [legislative debates or judicial] proceedings 
are necessary prerequisites for public debate about government operations.”); id. at 249 (“[A] right 
to government-held information is necessary to the creation of the self-controlled citizen.”). 
252 When governments are “uniquely situated to gather and disseminate” information, or when 
they are “virtually the only entities with resources willing to present a particular side of a public 
issue,” the information is particularly important to the process of self-government. Id. at 46; see also 
Note, The Rights of the Public and the Press to Gather Information , supra note 196, at 1510 (“Information 
within the sole control of a government, such as data it has gathered or facts about its internal workings, 
operations, and policies may be necessary for informed public evaluation of government activity.”). 
253 See Note, The First Amendment Right to Gather State-Held Information, 89 YALE L.J. 923, 930 
(1980) (“As part of its obligation to determine that will [of the majority of the electorate], the 
government must facilitate its accurate expression.”). 
254 See Yudof, supra note 13, at 870 (“[I]f the expression of local governments is protected, federal and 
state expression, or local speech of a more dangerous nature, may also be protected.”). 
1002 University of Pennsylvania Law Review [Vol. 166: 961 
government speech is a better candidate for protection than state or federal 
government speech and is materially distinguishable. 
D. Distinguishing Municipal Speech from State Speech 
Municipal speech brings unique benefits to a system of free expression 
that speech by state and federal governments does not. It seems almost a 
truism that “[l]ocal institutions are a vital part of public debate.”255 Not only 
do they contribute information of local public import to the marketplace of 
ideas, they serve as instruments of collective advocacy for local issues and 
groups that may not be able to marshal the resources to make their voices 
heard on a significant scale.256 Further, permitting local governments to bring 
constitutional challenges enables smaller polities to voice dissent as a way of 
engaging in self-expression and self-government.257 As David Barron noted, 
cities are not just administrative components of the state. They represent 
“distinct, democratic communities of interest” that give their residents a voice 
in statewide policy decisions by expressing disagreement.258 The Supreme 
Court has described cities in this way,259 despite lower courts suggesting this 
conception of government speech leaves out the views of dissenting 
citizens.260 Since the Supreme Court noticed this issue of minority dissent in 
Bellotti as applied to minority shareholders of corporations, but nevertheless 
granted the corporation speech protections, there are strong grounds to argue 
it is not a decisive objection. 
The concerns animating the CBS bar to speech protections are generally 
inapplicable against localities. CBS was a case concerning the federal 
government, not state or local government entities having free speech 
rights.261 Thus, many of the concerns mentioned are unique to the federal 
 
255 Bendor, supra note 23, at 425. 
256 See id. at 425-26 (asserting that activists organize national issues through local government 
and that “[m]unicipalities are sites of association, often more so than corporations”). 
257 See Morris, supra note 16, at 11 (“[L]ocal constitutional challenges to state government action 
. . . are a predictable side-effect of a political system that disaggregates decision-making.”). See 
generally Heather Gerken, Dissenting by Deciding, 57 STAN. L. REV. 1745 (2005) (discussing how local 
constitutional challenges to state action are a form of local self-expression). 
258 Barron, supra note 30, at 2238; see also Gerken, supra note 257, at 1791 (“While local 
governments lack the formal autonomy that sovereignty guarantees, territorial boundaries lend these 
institutions a level of functional independence that seems to exceed that accorded to many other 
disaggregated institutions.”). 
259 See, e.g., Village of Euclid v. Ambler Realty Co., 272 U.S. 365, 389 (1926) (“[G]overning 
authorities [of the Village of Euclid], presumably [represent] a majority of [the Village’s] inhabitants 
and voic[e] their will . . . .”). 
260 See Anderson v. City of Bos., 380 N.E.2d 628, 639 (1978) (stating that preventing dissenting 
minority taxpayers from being forced to finance a position they oppose is a compelling state interest). 
261 See Porterfield, supra note 151, at 33 (noting CBS was a dispute “involving the federal 
government, rather than a state or local government”). 
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government, like its size and power to drown out other communicators. This 
distinguishes local governments from the kind of government speaker that 
was the subject of Justice Stewart’s concurring opinion in CBS. “Local 
governments, indisputably, are generally much less menacing communicators 
than the vast federal agencies in Washington.”262 “Their voices would be few 
among the many[,] . . . unlikely to drown out other centers of 
communication.”263 Because of their smaller size and reach, local governments 
pose even less of a risk than state and federal governments do of crowding 
out private speakers in public debate or distorting the discussion. 
At the same time, local governments have a heightened interest in 
speaking without restrictions as they have “strong independent stakes in 
legislative decisions and voter approval or disapproval.”264 Because local 
governments raise a large percentage of their revenue from local taxes and are 
frequently granted control over their operations under home-rule statutes, 
they have a stake in making their policy positions known, separate from any 
interest the state government could assert.265 And because they are subject to 
the policy decisions of the state government, they have an interest in speaking truth 
to power analogous to that held by individuals. Local governments also “have a 
strong, independent stake in legislative decisions and in voter approval or 
disapproval of state constitutional amendments . . . and referendums.”266 
These separate interests are not well addressed by the bludgeon of 
Hunter’s local powerlessness doctrine. The rule is too simple to account for 
the separate and heightened interests local governments have in speaking 
without prior restraint.267 If Hunter’s purpose is to preserve the policy 
flexibility of states, permitting municipalities to assert speech rights does not 
significantly harm that interest. States could still shape the power of cities, 
just without the ability to target their speech-related functions.268 
Alternatively, should the Hunter doctrine apply, a city’s speech on issues 
of public importance could be characterized as proprietary and thus be 
distinguished from actions taken in its capacity as an arm of the state 
government. Across many areas of law, municipalities possess a dual capacity, 
 
262 YUDOF, supra note 113, at 48. 
263 Yudof, supra note 13, at 869. 
264 YUDOF, supra note 113, at 48. 
265 See Yudof, supra note 13, at 869 (noting that depending on local taxes for revenue leads local 
governments to inform the public to attempt to influence policy outcomes for voter approval). 
266 Id. 
267 See Note, The Constitutionality of Municipal Advocacy, supra note 12, at 539 (“[S]uch an 
approach does not even pretend to address the federal constitutional questions that municipal speech 
may raise. Its only axiom—that cities may speak only when states say they can—recognizes no limit 
on the type or amount of municipal expression which states may expressly authorize.”). 
268 See Bendor, supra note 23, at 426 (discussing treatment of municipalities as separate 
existences from the state for purposes of free speech). 
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functioning alternately as a public and private entity.269 Although whether an 
action is taken in a public or proprietary capacity varies across legal contexts, 
a government’s proprietary action is generally one that is taken for the 
“peculiar and special advantage of its inhabitants, rather than for the good of 
the state at large.”270 Courts seem to use the distinction between public and 
proprietary action to give governmental bodies “greater latitude when they 
act as participants in markets than when they regulate private businesses.”271 
Despite being applied to state action, this formulation could presumably 
apply to city action in the speech context as well. While the marketplace of 
ideas is not the same market with which the preceding quote is concerned, 
municipal speech is an act of participation in a public market rather than an 
act of regulation. When a city speaks to or for its residents, it seems to act for 
its citizens’ special advantage in a way analogous to making economic 
contracts. As Wells and Hellerstein note, “The distinction used in the 
commerce clause and constitutional rights contexts is roughly the same.”272 
Perhaps when a local government speaks, it acts in a proprietary capacity for 
its inhabitants in order to serve their unique localized interests. If so, the 
protection of municipal proprietary action counsels for protecting the speech 
of local governments in a way that permits constitutional claims against the 
state similar to the constitutional claims cities may raise in their proprietary 
capacity in other contexts.273 
IV. A MUNICIPAL SPEECH RIGHT APPLIED AGAINST THE STATE 
Very few cases have addressed the intersection of the Hunter and 
government speech doctrines. As noted in Part I, Hunter is read by several 
Circuit Courts of Appeals to be a doctrine of substantive constitutional law.274 
Whether Hunter’s local powerlessness bar is considered a part of the First 
Amendment is the subject of this Part. This Part examines the few cases in 
 
269 See 18 EUGENE MCQUILLIN, THE LAW OF MUNICIPAL CORPORATIONS § 53:6 (3d ed. 
2013) (noting that local governments have been described by courts as having a dual nature that is 
part governmental and part “corporate” or “proprietary”); Stanley Barlow, Nuisance or Negligence, 3 
TENN. L. REV. 5, 5 (1924) (“It is an elementary principle of law that municipal corporations act in 
a dual capacity, one known as their private or corporate character, and the other their public or 
governmental character.”). 
270 Dep’t of Treasury v. Evansville, 60 N.E.2d 952, 955 (Ind. 1945). 
271 Michael L. Wells & Walter Hellerstein, The Governmental–Proprietary Distinction in Constitutional 
Law, 66 VA. L. REV. 1073, 1076 (1980). 
272 Id. at 1076. But see Hugh D. Spitzer, Realigning the Governmental/Proprietary Distinction in 
Municipal Law, 40 SEATTLE U. L. REV. 173, 203 (2016) (“Fundamentally, the governmental/proprietary 
distinction does not translate well between various fields of law.”). 
273 See YUDOF, supra note 113, at 44 n.28 (explaining that cities act in a proprietary capacity to 
assert equal protection, due process, and privacy rights). 
274 See supra Part I; supra note 95 and accompanying text. 
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which the Court has had an opportunity to examine the status of municipalities 
in the context of the Free Speech Clause. It concludes that the court has yet to 
announce a bar on subdivisions asserting speech rights against their state. 
A. Marsh v. Alabama As a Limit on Hunter’s Reach 
Marsh v. Alabama demonstrates that, under the First Amendment, cities 
perform a constitutional function independent of the state, which requires 
both that state law does not entirely determine the nature of cities and that 
Hunter does not permit states to “manipulate [municipalities] in every 
conceivable way.”275 In Marsh, the Court addressed whether a state law could 
prohibit the door-to-door distribution of literature in a private company town 
by criminalizing the conduct as trespass. The Court held that private towns 
were no different than public towns in regard to their citizens being citizens 
of the state with a right to be informed from sources of their choosing in 
order to make decisions about the public welfare. Despite the fact that the 
state did not consider the private entity a public town, the Court found 
otherwise for purposes of the First Amendment’s Free Speech Clause because 
the substantive right at issue—the free exchange of ideas—was premised on 
there being a “local community within which such free exchanges could take 
place.”276 This demonstrates that the Court was willing to ignore how the state 
defined its political subdivisions when speech protected under the First 
Amendment was at issue.277 
While Marsh does not militate in favor of municipalities themselves 
having the protection of the First Amendment against their creating states, 
it demonstrates two principles of significance to this Comment. First, the 
Marsh Court viewed the status of localities under the First Amendment as 
not within the complete discretion of the state. Second, because Hunter was 
not even mentioned in the opinion, the Court seemed to consider Hunter to be 
irrelevant to the First Amendment context. These two lessons leave the door open 
for substantive First Amendment law to permit municipal claims against states. 
The Court in Marsh based its decision in part on cases requiring a public 
municipality under the First Amendment to provide for the free exchange of 
ideas.278 A state law requiring a city to deny such an opportunity would run 
 
275 Gomillion v. Lightfoot, 364 U.S. 339, 344 (1960). 
276 Barron, supra note 35, at 565. 
277 While Marsh has been overruled to the extent that criminal penalties for trespass onto 
private property have been upheld as an acceptable restriction of private speech, those cases have 
left untouched the Court’s decision to define for itself what constitutes a public “town” for First 
Amendment purposes. See Lloyd Corp. v. Tanner, 407 U.S. 551, 569-70 (1972) (upholding a trespass 
law as applied to a private shopping mall because it was not functionally a town). 
278 Marsh v. Alabama, 326 U.S. 501, 505 (1946) (“[I]t is clear that had the people of Chickasaw 
owned all the homes, and all the stores, and all the streets, and all the sidewalks, all those owners 
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afoul of this mandate, and Hunter’s language that a state may “withdraw all 
. . . powers” from a municipality would not rescue such a law.279 David Barron 
points out this is consistent with cases like Gomillion and Avery, in which the 
Court rejected state definitions of municipalities when it resulted in 
violations of the individual constitutional rights of residents.280 Further, 
Barron notes that subsequent cases like Seattle School District, Romer, and 
Milliken show municipalities themselves can raise these claims against their 
creating states.281 Taken together with Marsh, this suggests that Hunter does 
not prevent municipalities from raising First Amendment claims against their 
creating state when the rights of its residents are infringed by a state law. While 
Marsh featured a private plaintiff, the lesson of Gomillion suggests a municipal 
plaintiff raising this right against the state would also not be barred by Hunter. 
If this is true, it could also serve as a foundation for municipalities to raise their 
own First Amendment right to free speech against their creating state. 
B. The City of Boston v. Anderson Distinguished from  
Municipal Speech Claims 
Scholars like Mark Yudof have summarily dismissed the possibility of 
First Amendment protections for municipal speech against restriction by the 
state by pointing to City of Boston v. Anderson.282 The Court dismissed an 
appeal from Massachusetts’s highest court in which the city raised a First 
Amendment challenge against a state law restricting expenditure of municipal 
funds to support political advocacy in a state referendum. The Massachusetts 
court stated “we suspect that the First Amendment has nothing to do with 
this intra-state question of the rights of a political subdivision” to challenge 
the state.283 However, it also noted the issue was undecided and instead 
 
together could not have set up a municipal government with sufficient power to pass an ordinance 
completely barring the distribution of religious literature.” (citing Lovell v. City of Griffin, 303 U.S. 
444, 452-53 (1938) (holding public cities can’t bar distribution of specific ideas by leaflet on public 
streets))); Jamison v. Texas, 318 U.S. 413, 417 (1943) (disallowing a complete ban on distribution by 
a city on public streets). 
279 Hunter v. City of Pittsburgh, 207 U.S. 161, 178 (1907). 
280 Barron, supra note 35, at 567-68 (stating the rule in Gomillion to be that the state is not 
insulated from federal judicial review when it appeals to its power to control local governments to 
circumvent a federally protected right). 
281 See id. at 568 (suggesting that the cases encourage judges to “[limit] state attempts to 
interfere with local affairs in certain constitutional contexts”). 
282 YUDOF, supra note 113, at 48 (stating “[t]he Supreme Court has held that such a claim raises 
no substantial federal question” (citing Parklane Hosiery Co. v. Shore, 439 U.S. 1060 (1979))). 
283 Anderson v. City of Bos., 380 N.E.2d 628, 637 (Mass. 1978). The Massachusetts court 
further stated “the First Amendment has nothing to do with a State’s determination to refrain from 
speech on a given topic or topics and to bar its various subdivisions from expending funds in 
contravention of that determination.” Id. 
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assumed arguendo that the municipality’s advocacy expenditure was 
protected speech.284 The Massachusetts court went on to assume arguendo 
that the law restricted protected speech by the city, but determined the state 
had a compelling interest in restricting that speech sufficient to survive strict 
scrutiny and the restriction was narrowly tailored to that interest.285 The 
Supreme Court dismissed the appeal per curiam, stating only that the case 
failed to raise a “substantial federal question.”286 From this, scholars of the 
time argued that the Court has held it is constitutional for a state to restrict 
the speech of its subdivisions.287 
However, a per curiam dismissal for want of a substantial federal question 
“should not be understood as breaking new ground.”288 A holding that the 
First Amendment is one of the substantive provisions that incorporates the 
Hunter doctrine would surely have been new ground in 1978. Additionally, 
because such a per curiam dismissal does not establish new law, it merely 
precludes lower courts from “coming to opposite conclusions on the precise 
issues presented and necessarily decided by those actions.”289 One of the few 
certainties about dismissals for want of a federal question is they are “a 
decision on the merits.”290 Thus, lower courts are bound to hold only that 
states have a compelling interest sufficient to survive strict scrutiny in 
restricting public expenditures for the purpose of political advocacy in a state 
election. It was not “necessarily decided” that all restrictions of municipal 
speech would be served by, or properly tailored to, such an interest. And 
because the Massachusetts court’s suspicions about the powerlessness of 
localities was not necessarily decided in the judgment, the appeal’s dismissal 
is entirely consistent with the conclusion that the Hunter doctrine is a 
substantive part of the First Amendment in all situations. The Court’s 
dismissal simply affirmed that states have a compelling interest sufficient to 
overcome the First Amendment challenge by the city in that context. The 
question of whether the First Amendment protects cities is far from settled 
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Ensuring dissenting taxpayers did not finance “expression on an election issue of views with which 
they disagreed” justified the restriction of protected speech so long as the law was “closely drawn to 
avoid unnecessary abridgement” of the First Amendment. Id. at 638-39 (citing First Nat’l Bank of 
Bos. v. Bellotti, 435 U.S. 765, 786 (1978)). 
286 City of Bos. v. Anderson, 439 U.S. 1060 (1979). 
287 YUDOF, supra note 113, at 48 (concluding the Court has held that it is constitutional for a 
state law to “[forbid] municipalities from devoting local or state resources to some or all public 
relations and advertising activities”). 
288 Mandel v. Bradley, 432 U.S. 173, 176 (1977). 
289 Id. 
290 Gerald T. Anglin, Government Referendum Advocacy: An Emerging Free Speech Problem, 29 
CASE WESTERN RES. L. REV. 886, 894 (1979). 
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by this dismissal.291 Indeed, that the Court affirmed a decision on the merits 
of a First Amendment challenge suggests that the plaintiff city is, at least 
prima facie, protected under that provision. 
As a per curiam dismissal, Anderson is limited to its facts. The restriction 
in Anderson was “a legislative direction that no municipal funds be expended 
for the purpose of influencing the result of a referendum” to amend the state 
constitution.292 Laws restricting the release of body camera data are 
distinguishable from such a law on several relevant grounds. 
First, such laws are not directed at protecting a statewide effort to secure 
consent of the governed. Scholars like Mark Yudof are frequently concerned 
with the power of government speech to distort the political process and in 
doing so erode the basis of democratic self-government.293 Laws that restrict 
municipal speech beyond the context of statewide referendums are dissimilar 
to Anderson’s facts, and more importantly, do not threaten to overpower 
private political speech in the context of elections or referenda. Further, 
because the behavior of local police officers is unlikely to be determinative of 
a statewide election, body camera data are unlikely to be put to the purpose 
of binding other localities through influencing the self-governing process.294 
Finally, raw or redacted police body camera data serves a different function 
than partisan advertising. There is far less opportunity for a government 
official or controlling party to craft a self-serving policy message when a 
government body is not shaping a message, but rather sharing gathered data. 
Such a difference responds to concerns that government speech protections 
would be used to benefit a particular office holder’s own reelection.295 
C. The Most Recent Rule from Ysursa 
The Court has only recently addressed the status of municipalities under 
the First Amendment, albeit with the brevity and lack of rationale customary 
to Hunter and its progeny. In Ysursa v. Pocatello Education Ass’n, employee 
unions challenged an Idaho law which prohibited public sector employers 
 
291 See id. at 895 (“[A]fter Anderson, the question of whether the first amendment protects or 
prohibits governmental referendum advocacy remains.”). 
292 Anderson v. City of Bos., 380 N.E.2d 628, 635 (Mass. 1978). 
293 Note, The Constitutionality of Municipal Advocacy, supra note 12, at 544 (cautioning that First 
Amendment protections for government speech must take account of whether government 
“intrusion into the machinery of democracy is or is not legitimate”). 
294 The local nexus of effect answers Barron’s concern that local constitutional challenges to state 
restrictions should only be permitted when localities seek self-determination rather than to impose a 
constitutional framework on other localities. See Barron, supra note 30, at 2222 (arguing a city’s interpretive 
independence is “at its lowest ebb” when seeking to force other localities to “follow a single course”). 
295 YUDOF, supra note 113, at 49 (worrying that “municipal governments may be expressing 
the views of public officials who are attempting to create a majority, and not representing a majority 
in . . . pending policy debates”). 
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from offering payroll deductions for union membership fees and the union’s 
political activities as a content-based restriction because it disfavored political 
speech in violation of the First and Fourteenth Amendments.296 The district 
court upheld the law as applied to public employers at the state level because 
the First Amendment does not require the government to subsidize private 
speech through the provision of payroll deductions.297 However, it found the 
law unconstitutional as applied to local government employers because it did 
not find that the state provided any subsidy for the administration of payroll 
deductions at the local level.298 
The Ninth Circuit agreed, finding the relationship between the state and 
its political subdivisions to be “analogous to that between the State and a 
regulated private utility.”299 It went on to find that while ultimate control of 
the municipalities rested with the state legislature, it did not actually fund 
the payroll deduction system at issue.300 
The Supreme Court disagreed, holding that while the First Amendment 
restrains the government from abridging speech, it does not provide an 
affirmative right to government-funded assistance of speech.301 The Court 
found the assistance of payroll deductions provided by the local government 
employers was attributable to the state, regardless of a lack of any direct 
management or funding by the state itself, because the relationship was that 
of a political subdivision, a mere department of the state without privileges 
or immunities against its creator.302 The assistance to private speech was thus 
provided by the state through its instrumentality, making the law a decision 
of the state to not provide a subsidy for the exercise of a fundamental right, 
 
296 555 U.S. 353 (2009); see also Brian Olney, Paycheck Protection or Paycheck Deception? When 
Government “Subsidies” Silence Political Speech, 4 U.C. IRVINE L. REV. 881, 909-10 (2014) (discussing 
Ysursa and its implications). 
297 See Pocatello Educ. Ass’n. v. Heideman, No. CV-03-0256-E-BLW, 2005 WL 3241745, at *2 (D. 
Idaho Nov. 23, 2005) (“[T]he State is under no First Amendment obligation to subsidize speech by 
providing . . . payroll deductions for the purpose of paying union dues or association fees for State 
employees.”). 
298 See id. (stating that the “State cannot use the anti-subsidy argument to justify the VCA to 
the extent that it applies to local governments”). 
299 See Ysursa, 555 U.S. at 358. 
300 Id. 
301 See id. (explaining that government is “not required to assist others in funding the expression 
of particular ideas, including political ones”); RODNEY A. SMOLLA, FEDERAL CIVIL RIGHTS ACT 
§1:1 (3d ed. 2017) (“In Ysursa v. Pocatello Education Association, for example, the Supreme Court held that 
while the First Amendment operates as a negative restraint to forbid government from ‘abridging the 
freedom of speech,’ the First Amendment does not confer an affirmative right ‘to use government 
payroll mechanisms for the purpose of obtaining funds for expression.’”). 
302 See Ysursa, 555 U.S. at 362-63 (citing Williams v. Mayor of Balt., 289 U.S. 36, 40 (1933); 
City of Trenton v. New Jersey, 262 U.S. 182, 185 (1923)). 
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an act requiring only a rational basis.303 The Court held the standard was 
satisfied by the state’s legitimate interest in avoiding the appearance of 
government favoritism or entanglement in partisan politics.304 
Ultimately, the narrow ruling of Ysursa is that the provision of assistance 
to private speech by local government is really provided by the state because 
local government is a creation of the state for the convenient exercise of its 
powers. The Court apparently considered the state “the proprietor” of the 
locality’s payroll system,305 which made the system a state subsidy supporting 
private speech and within the state’s discretion to withhold. However, being 
an administrative instrumentality for payroll purposes is different from being 
an instrumentality in all things, as the many cases permitting municipalities 
to make constitutional claims against their creating states demonstrate.306 
While Ysursa decided a claim under the First Amendment, the status of a 
municipality’s own rights under that amendment was not at issue. The 
plaintiffs were not municipalities, but instead private unions.307 The parties 
did not even brief the issue of whether the local government employers had 
a First Amendment right to provide assistance to the private speech of unions 
and employees in the form of payroll deductions.308 
Nor is the denial of such a right a necessary premise of the holding that 
municipal payroll systems are an extension of the state’s administrative 
system.309 The Court did not make clear whether it was deciding a local 
government’s payroll system was a forum for speech ultimately belonging to 
the state by virtue of the creator–instrumentality relationship, or whether the 
state and its instrumentalities are a single government speaker and the 
decision not to assist private speech was a speaker’s decision not to facilitate 
private speech. If the former rationale controls the decision, municipalities 
can be distinct speakers protected by the First Amendment against 
infringement while the fora they administer are property ultimately owned 
 
303 See Ysursa, 555 U.S. at 359 (citing Regan v. Taxation with Representation of Wash., 461 
U.S. 540, 549 (1983)). 
304 Id. at 359. 
305 See Brief of Respondent at 32, Ysursa, 555 U.S. 353 (No. 07-869). 
306 See supra text accompanying notes 38–46 (discussing cases in which the Court has decided 
constitutional claims by cities against their creating states on the merits despite Hunter). 
307 See Ysursa, 555 U.S. at 356 (describing respondents as “plaintiff labor organizations”). 
308 The plaintiffs instead argued that because local governments were the proprietors of the fora 
of payrolls and distinct entities with the ability to hold property themselves, the state government was 
attempting to exercise control of another government entity’s fora rather than overseeing the use of its 
own property. See Brief of Respondent at 41, Ysursa, 555 U.S. 353 (No. 07-869). 
309 The Court characterized the law as the legislature’s decision to withhold from local 
government employers “the power to provide payroll deductions for political activities,” relying on 
Trenton’s language that all powers of subdivisions exist at the pleasure of the state. Ysursa, 555 U.S. 
at 362. However, a city’s power to provide a forum for speech seems not to be the same as a city’s 
own right to speak. 
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by the state. According to this rationale, the Court has not ruled under 
substantive First Amendment law that municipalities are not distinct from 
their creating states, despite quoting broadly from Williams and Trenton,310 
preserving the possibility of a municipal free speech claim against a creating 
state in jurisdictions which limit Hunter to its substantive provisions, such as 
in the Second Circuit.311 It seems as though a distinction can be made between 
states and municipalities—i.e., that although they share a single source of 
funding, they still maintain enough independence to be treated as separate 
speakers. A reading of Ysursa which would fuse state and municipal 
governments as a single speaker runs counter to constitutional case law 
deferring to a state’s own decisions of how to structure its municipalities.312 
Because Hunter is limited to the substantive provisions it addressed and 
Gomillion permits municipalities to raise constitutional claims against their 
states,313 First Amendment Speech claims by municipalities against their 
creating state may be viable if government speech is protected. As Marsh 
indicates, the Court may not follow Hunter in a First Amendment free speech 
context.314 As a per curiam dismissal for want of a substantial federal question, 
Anderson adds little wisdom to predictions of the Court’s view of locality 
speech against state restriction. Ysursa did not address whether government 
speakers were protected under the First Amendment, but its ambiguous language 
regarding the relationship between municipal and state governments, while not 
a binding decision on Hunter’s applicability in the speech context, indicates some 
deference to unity. However, as the Ysursa Court did not squarely address 
whether the state and local levels of government are a single speaker for First 
Amendment purposes, it remains an arguable issue. 
There is a doctrinal foundation for municipalities to challenge state laws 
preventing dissemination of PWBC data. At the very least, Hunter should not 
 
310 Williams v. Mayor of Balt., 289 U.S. 36, 40 (1933) (noting that a political subdivision 
“created by a state for the better ordering of government, has no privileges or immunities under the 
federal constitution which it may invoke in opposition to the will of its creator”); City of Trenton 
v. New Jersey, 262 U.S. 182, 187 (1923) (holding political subdivisions are “merely . . . department[s] 
of the State, and the State may withhold, grant or withdraw powers and privileges as it sees fit”). 
311 See, e.g., New York v. Richardson, 473 F.2d 923, 929 (2d Cir. 1973). 
312 A purpose of the Hunter doctrine is to preserve the supremacy of the state in its dealings 
with its subordinate creations. See Hunter v. City of Pittsburgh, 207 U.S. 161, 178 (1907) (“The State 
. . . at its pleasure, may modify or withdraw all such powers.” (emphasis added)); Barron, supra note 
35, at 562 (“Although the cases are legion that assert that state law defines the scope of local 
governmental power, none has done so more forcefully, or more famously, than Hunter . . . .”). A 
blanket federal prohibition on cities suing their state under federal constitutional prohibitions 
preempts any state law attempting to define cities as independent entities with federal constitutional 
rights. Such a doctrine does not take seriously how a state chooses to structure its relationship with 
its municipalities and so cannot be justified by reference to the Hunter doctrine. 
313 See supra Part I. 
314 See supra Section IV.A. 
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deny municipalities the power to challenge state restrictions of free speech 
for lack of an independent existence without regard to how the state has 
chosen to structure the restrictions. In any case, a separate constitutional 
claim may be available for municipalities that wish to challenge such laws. 
V. ANALYZING A GOVERNMENT SPEAKER’S FIRST  
AMENDMENT CLAIM 
If the speech of local government entities is entitled to protection under the 
First Amendment as the previous Part suggests, the question remains how a 
challenge to speech restraints should be analyzed under existing jurisprudence. 
This Part will outline a hypothetical challenge using the law of North Carolina as 
an example, and conclude that when a law requires approval by a judge for police 
officials to publicly release PWBC data, it imposes a prior restraint on speech 
that is content-based, subject to strict scrutiny, and likely unconstitutional. 
North Carolina state law prohibits the custodian of PWBC data from 
disclosing video to anyone unless their image or voice is a subject of the 
recording.315 In addition, release to such a person must be done pursuant to a 
court order.316 This law applies to any recordings made by body cameras, 
dashboard cameras, or any other recording device operated by police 
personnel while carrying out law enforcement responsibilities.317 
If the speech of local governments is protected under the First 
Amendment, then the public release of PWBC data is an expressive speech 
act entitled to constitutional protection. It is settled law that the publication 
of video is an expressive speech act within the ambit of the First 
Amendment’s protection.318 Film is a significant “medium for the 
communication of ideas,” and its distribution has therefore been recognized 
as an expressive act of constitutional significance.319 It is also uncontroversial 
that requiring approval by a state official to distribute a film to the public is 
a prior restraint on speech. Such was the precise posture of Joseph Burstyn, Inc. 
v. Wilson, wherein the Court struck down a statute that required film 
distributors to seek state-issued licenses to distribute motion pictures, and 
 
315 N.C. GEN. STAT. § 132-1.4A(c)(1) (2016). 
316 N.C. GEN. STAT. § 132-1.4A(g) (2016) (“Recordings in the custody of a law enforcement 
agency shall only be released pursuant to court order.”). 
317 N.C. GEN. STAT. § 132-1.4A(a) (2016). 
318 See Joseph Burstyn, Inc. v. Wilson, 343 U.S. 495, 502 (1952) (“[W]e conclude that 
expression by means of motion pictures is included within the free speech and free press guaranty 
of the First and Fourteenth Amendments.”); see also Kreimer, supra note 179, at 373 (“[T]he Court 
regularly confirmed that images in films can claim First Amendment protection whether displayed 
publicly or reviewed in private . . . .”). 
319 Joseph Burstyn, 343 U.S. at 501-02. 
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restricted the issuance of such licenses to films deemed not “sacrilegious.”320 
The prohibition of prior restraints on speech has been a core concern of First 
Amendment protections for decades.321 Consequently, prior restraints on 
speech are particularly disfavored.322 While the Court has been clear that the 
right to speak using video may be subject to some degree of prior restraint,323 
the burden of justifying the restriction a censor imposes is heavy and lies with 
the government imposing the restriction.324 
The burden of justifying a prior restraint on the release of PWBC data is 
given shape by the Court’s decisions regarding content-based restrictions. 
When a restriction upon speech depends on the type of message 
communicated, the law is not content-neutral and is examined with the 
highest degree of scrutiny.325 Restrictions on PWBC data disclosure require 
“enforcement authorities to examine the content of the message that is 
conveyed to determine whether” the municipal speaker’s message contains 
 
320 Id. at 497. 
321 See Citizens United v. Fed. Election Comm’n, 588 U.S. 310, 336 (2010) (noting the functional 
equivalent of a prior restraint chilled speech in violation of the First Amendment); N.Y. Times Co. v. 
United States, 403 U.S. 713, 714 (1971) (“Any system of prior restraints of expression comes to this Court 
bearing a heavy presumption against its constitutional validity . . . .” (citing Bantam Books, Inc. v. 
Sullivan, 372 U.S. 58, 70 (1963))); Near v. Minnesota ex rel. Olsen, 283 U.S. 697, 713 (1931) (“In 
determining the extent of the constitutional protection, it has been generally, if not universally, 
considered that it is the chief purpose of the guaranty to prevent previous restraints upon publication 
. . . .”); see also Superior Films, Inc. v. Dep’t of Educ. of Ohio, 346 U.S. 587, 588 (1954) (citing Near for 
the proposition that “[t]he ‘chief purpose’ of the constitutional guaranty of liberty of the press . . . 
was ’to prevent previous restraints upon publication’”); Patterson v. Colorado ex rel. Att’y Gen., 205 
U.S. 454, 462 (1907) (stating “the main purpose of such constitutional provisions [as the First 
Amendment] is ‘to prevent all such previous restraints upon publications as had been practiced by other 
governments.’” (citation omitted) (emphasis in original)). 
322 See Joseph Burstyn, 343 U.S. at 503 (describing prior restraint as “a form of infringement 
upon freedom of expression to be especially condemned”). 
323 See, e.g., Times Film Corp. v. City of Chi., 365 U.S. 43, 49-50 (1961) (upholding a requirement 
that film purveyors submit their films to a city official before publication on the grounds that the mere 
fact of being a prior restraint did not challenge the standard by which restraint was applied). 
324 See Freedman v. Maryland, 380 U.S. 51, 57 (1965) (noting that “it is as true [for film] as of 
other forms of expression that ‘(a)ny system of prior restraints of expression comes to this Court 
bearing a heavy presumption against its constitutional validity.’” (citation omitted)); id. at 58 
(“[T]he burden of proving that the film is unprotected expression must rest on the censor.”). 
325 See Matal v. Tam, 137 S. Ct. 1744, 1765-66 (2017) (“The First Amendment guards against 
laws ‘targeted at specific subject matter,’ a form of speech suppression known as content based 
discrimination . . . .” (citing Reed v. Gilbert, 135 S. Ct. 2218, 2230 (2015))); Reed 135 S. Ct. at 2232 
(striking down a law which regulated signs differently based on the type of message they 
communicated because it singled out speech on the basis of its contents without being narrowly 
tailored to a compelling government interest); Turner Broad. Sys. v. Fed. Commc’ns Comm’n, 512 
U.S. 622, 642 (1999) (noting that content-based restrictions on protected speech are the subject of 
“the most exacting scrutiny”); see also Kreimer, supra note 179, at 391 (“[P]ublication of ‘lawfully 
obtain[ed] truthful information about a matter of public significance’ may not be punished ‘absent a 
need . . . of the highest order.’” (citing Bartnicki v. Vopper, 532 U.S. 514, 528 (2001))). 
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information garnered from a PWBC, making it a content-based law.326 
Because, “as a general matter . . . government has no power to restrict 
expression because of its message, its ideas, its subject matter, or its 
content,”327 content-based restrictions are presumptively invalid and must be 
justified by a compelling government interest that is unrelated to the 
suppression of the message itself.328 There are specific exceptions to this rule, 
but they are limited to laws regulating enumerated, historic categories of 
speech which are unprotected by the First Amendment and are not applicable 
to disclosures of PWBC data.329 Further, the legislature does not have the 
power to define new categories of unprotected speech.330 Thus, state 
legislatures cannot simply declare law enforcement recordings to be exempt 
from First Amendment protection. Since a law which requires all releases of 
video to be approved by a judge of the state’s court is a restriction based on 
the content of the speech, the law must be supported by, and narrowly tailored 
to, a compelling government interest.331 The Court has said that a narrowly 
tailored law must be the “least restrictive means among available, effective 
alternatives.”332 A law restricting PWBC data release must therefore be 
written so as to prohibit only the release of unprotected speech and protected 
speech that cannot be released without harming the compelling governmental 
 
326 McCullen v. Coakley, 134 S. Ct. 2518, 2531 (2014) (citations omitted). 
327 Ashcroft v. Am. Civil Liberties Union, 535 U.S. 564, 573 (2004) (citations omitted). 
328 See United States v. Alvarez, 132 S. Ct. 2537, 2544 (2012) (“[T]he Constitution demands 
that content-based restrictions on speech be presumed invalid and that the Government bear the 
burden of showing their constitutionality.” (citing Ashcroft, 542 U.S. at 660)); United States v. 
O’Brien, 391 U.S. 367, 377 (1968) (requiring the government interest in regulating speech to be 
“unrelated to suppression of free expression”); Bantam Books, Inc. v. Sullivan, 372 U.S. 58, 70 (1963) 
(“Any system of prior restraints of expression comes to this Court bearing a heavy presumption 
against its constitutional validity.”).  
329 Such unprotected categories of speech include obscenity, Roth v. United States, 354 U.S. 
476 (1957), fighting words, Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire, 315 U.S. 568 (1942), defamation, N.Y. 
Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254 (1964), incitements to violence, Brandenburg v. Ohio, 395 U.S. 
444 (1969), and true threats, Watts v. United States, 394 U.S. 705 (1969). 
330 See United States v. Stevens, 559 U.S. 460, 470-71 (2010) (striking down a restraint on video 
games by emphatically rejecting the proposition that the legislature could define new categories of 
unprotected speech, disclaiming the idea as “startling and dangerous”). 
331 See Reed v. Gilbert, 135 S. Ct. 2218 (2015) (holding that content-based regulations must 
survive strict scrutiny); see also Brown v. Entm’t Merchs. Ass’n., 564 U.S. 786, 799 (2011) (striking 
down a content-based restriction on the grounds that it cannot be justified “by a compelling 
government interest” and must be “narrowly drawn to serve that interest”); Perry Educ. Ass’n v. 
Perry Local Educators’ Ass’n, 460 U.S. 37, 45 (1983) (“For the State to enforce a content-based 
exclusion it must show that its regulation is necessary to serve a compelling state interest and that 
it is narrowly drawn to achieve that end.”). 
332 Ashcroft, 542 U.S. at 666; see also Alvarez, 132 S. Ct. at 2549 (“There must be a direct causal 
link between the restriction imposed and the injury to be prevented.”). 
2018] Body Camera Video Restrictions 1015 
interests animating the law. Such a law cannot “burden substantially more 
speech than is necessary to further the government’s legitimate interests.”333 
The North Carolina law lays out several standards by which a judge is to 
decide whether to release PWBC data the custodian requests permission to 
disclose to interested parties. These include factors such as whether release (1) is 
“necessary to advance a compelling public interest”; (2) “would reveal 
information of a highly sensitive [and] personal nature”; (3) “would harm the 
reputation or jeopardize the safety of a person”; or (4) would destroy the 
confidentiality “necessary to protect an active or potential internal or criminal 
investigation.”334 In addition to these enumerated factors, the judge is also 
permitted to consider “any other standards the court deems relevant.”335 Giving 
a censor the ability to deny release of video upon any grounds they deem relevant 
is a sure failure of narrow tailoring. There must be meat on the bone to even 
analyze whether the limits on discretion are fitted to constitutional proportions. 
In Joseph Burstyn, the far more specific standard which allowed a censor to 
refuse to grant a license because they deemed a film “sacrilegious” was an 
unconstitutional standard because it granted the censor “unlimited 
restraining control over motion pictures.”336 Allowing a judge to deny 
requests to release video upon any grounds they deem relevant provides for 
absolutely no limit on the judge’s control of what speech is restricted. Such 
is the very definition of “unlimited restraining control.”337 It is no answer that 
judges, being bound by the Constitution, will only restrict speech which may 
be constitutionally restricted. As the Court has held, a promise by the 
government that it will not apply a law unconstitutionally is not sufficient to 
save a law from being declared unconstitutional.338 The implicit promise that 
judicial officials will only exercise the constitutional portion of an overbroad 
censor power would just as readily be deemed insufficient under the strict 
scrutiny standard.339 
 
333 Packingham v. North Carolina, 137 S. Ct. 1730, 1736 (2017) (citing McCullen v. Coakley, 134 
S. Ct. 2518, 2534 (2014)). 
334 N.C. GEN. STAT. § 132-1.4A(g) (2016). 
335 Id. 
336 Joseph Burstyn, Inc. v. Wilson, 343 U.S. 495, 505 (1952). 
337 Seth Kreimer has noted that, when it comes to laws justified by the state’s interest in 
protecting individual privacy, “[c]atchall statutes . . . invoked on the basis of standardless discretion 
do not meet [the narrow tailoring] requirement.” Kreimer, supra note 179, at 393. 
338 See United States v. Stevens, 559 U.S. 460, 480 (2010) (“We would not uphold an 
unconstitutional statute merely because the Government promised to use it responsibly.”). 
339 Even under intermediate scrutiny, complete prohibitions on access to forums of public 
discourse have been struck down as improperly suppressing “lawful speech as the means to suppress 
unlawful speech.” Packingham v. North Carolina, 137 S. Ct. 1730, 1738 (2017) (citations omitted) 
(invalidating a state law which prohibited registered sex offenders from accessing social networking 
web sites because the complete bar inhibited the exercise of First Amendment rights on websites 
which were “integral to the fabric of our modern society”). While the Court recognized the 
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A. Individual Privacy as a Compelling State Interest 
Should a law restricting PWBC data disclosure present more specific 
standards, they likely would mirror those enumerated in North Carolina’s law. 
These standards embody the compelling interests that would likely be advanced 
to justify a restriction of protected speech under strict scrutiny. First among 
these interests would be protecting the individual privacy of those people 
depicted in the videos, mirroring the concerns the press and public have raised 
in response to body camera proliferation in recent years. These concerns 
generally cluster around concerns over the need to prevent harm to the 
reputation of depicted people, to prevent physical harm from befalling such 
people, or even to prevent invasions of private places from becoming public. 
The tension between individual privacy and protected speech has a long 
history and is without definite resolution when it comes to truthful speech.340 
The Court has repeatedly refused to state in broad terms whether “truthful 
publication may ever be punished consistent with the First Amendment.”341 
Thus, the following discussion will not attempt a comprehensive analysis of 
the many privacy concerns PWBC video raises, but it will instead offer a few 
broad-stroked guideposts by which a court might measure a restriction under 
strict scrutiny. Since the Court has preferred to issue narrow rulings on 
whether the privacy interests animating a restriction are significantly 
important and proportionately protected to justify any given limit on 
speech,342 this Section will only look to a few prominent privacy interests that 
have been raised by critics of body cameras. 
Should a government proponent of a law restricting PWBC data release 
claim a compelling government interest in preserving an individual’s privacy 
interest in protecting their communications with police, the Court would 
likely view such an interest as insufficient to satisfy strict scrutiny. Critics of 
body cameras regularly raise the invasion of individual privacy as a concern 
 
legitimacy of the government’s interest in preventing the sexual abuse of children, the complete bar 
to accessing an important forum of public discourse was not narrowly tailored to that interest nor 
necessary for its achievement, even though it was a content-neutral law. Id. at 1737. Similarly, a carte 
blanche grant of censorship authority to a judge over distribution of PWBC data silences protected 
speech without necessity. 
340 Libel law addresses the balance between privacy and false speech. See, e.g., N.Y. Times Co. 
v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254 (1964). However, the privacy interest in avoiding false or defamatory 
publicity is treated differently than avoiding true representations of one’s private, but newsworthy, 
life. Id. at 302 (“Where public matters are involved, the doubts should be resolved in favor of 
freedom of expression rather than against it . . . .” (citations omitted)). 
341 Bartnicki v. Vopper, 532 U.S. 514, 529 (2001). 
342 See Florida Star v. B.J.F., 491 U.S. 524, 533 (“We continue to believe that the sensitivity 
and significance of the interests presented in clashes between [the] First Amendment and privacy 
rights counsel relying on limited principles that sweep no more broadly than the appropriate context 
of the instant case.”). 
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necessitating limited use.343 However, a bare interest in preserving the 
privacy of an individual’s behavior was held insufficient to justify a 
prohibition on speech of public importance, even when that speech was 
factually inaccurate.344 It seems unlikely that speech on a matter of public 
importance that does not contain factual inaccuracies, like a video recording, 
would be any less privileged. Indeed, the Court has said that individual 
“privacy concerns give way when balanced against the interest in publishing 
matters of public importance.”345 
However, in places where an individual has a reasonable expectation of 
privacy, such as in her own home, it cannot be plausibly argued that she has 
chosen to bear the loss of privacy “associated with participation in public 
affairs.”346 Records are made by PWBC inside people’s homes, either during 
consensual entries (like investigating a burglary), or during nonconsensual 
entries (like investigating a domestic violence situation).347 Where the Fourth 
Amendment protects individual privacy from government intrusion without 
constitutional justification, that expectation of privacy could presumably 
protect one from publication as well. The Court has recognized that “[t]he 
State’s interest in protecting the well-being, tranquility, and privacy of the 
home is certainly of the highest order in a free and civilized society.”348 This 
interest in preserving the privacy of the home has been held sufficient in the 
First Amendment context to prevent speakers from foisting their message on 
unwilling audiences in places where they have an expectation of privacy from 
such messages.349 While this is not strictly analogous to prohibiting the 
publishing of messages gathered while legally inside the home, it does 
 
343 Jay Stanley, Police-Mounted Body Cameras: With Right Policies in Place, a Win for All, ACLU 
(March 2015), https://www.aclu.org/other/police-body-mounted-cameras-right-policies-place-
win-all [http://perma.cc/HCY9-WNEH] (noting that there is a legitimate government interest 
in avoiding “embarrassing and titillating releases of video,” an area of particular concern given 
the motivation to do so when the video concerns celebrities). 
344 See Time, Inc. v. Hill, 385 U.S. 374, 388 (1967) (“Exposure of the self to others in varying 
degrees is a concomitant of life in a civilized community. The risk of this exposure is an essential 
incident of life in a society which places a primary value on freedom of speech and of press.”). 
345 Bartnicki, 532 U.S. at 516 (“One of the costs associated with participation in public affairs 
is an attendant loss of privacy.”). 
346 Id. at 534. 
347 Stanley, supra note 343. 
348 Carey v. Brown, 447 U.S. 455, 471 (1980) (emphasis added); see also Frisby v. Schultz, 487 
U.S. 474, 488 (1988) (upholding a municipal ordinance that banned picketing in front of private 
residences because it was narrowly tailored to the significant government interest of protecting 
residential privacy). 
349 See Cohen v. California, 403 U.S. 15, 21 (1971) (stating that the government could only 
suppress speech to protect an unwilling listener “upon a showing that substantial privacy interests 
are being invaded in an essentially intolerable manner”); Rowan v. Post Office Dept., 397 U.S. 728, 
736-37 (1970) (permitting the government to ban unwanted mailings to private residences at the 
request of the recipient because there must be a sufficient measure of privacy in the household). 
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indicate that the privacy of the home is a compelling interest in the First 
Amendment context. On this basis, perhaps a law requiring a censor to 
consider whether PWBC data was gathered inside a private residence would 
be narrowly tailored to a compelling state interest.350 However, those same 
concerns might not be implicated for recordings taken in public since there 
is no reasonable expectation of privacy, and PWBC do not collect the same 
broad range of data about an individual that the Court found excessive under 
the mosaic theory in United States v. Jones.351 
The government may also suggest that it is not the invasion of individual 
privacy that animates its restriction of PWBC data disclosure, but that it is 
instead the protection of the people depicted. Critics of body cameras have 
noted that some people who are the subject of recordings may be put in 
danger by having their conversation recorded and released—witnesses and 
informants being among the frequently mentioned groups.352 It could further 
be argued that the possibility of publication will chill public willingness to 
report crimes and speak to the police because they risk speaking on the 
record.353 Victims of sensitive crimes like sexual assault or domestic violence 
would be particularly dissuaded from reporting those crimes if they knew 
their reports would be subject to later publication.354 This argument 
implicates the government’s ability to protect public safety, as law 
enforcement often depends on the cooperation of witnesses and victims. This 
would likely be a stronger interest than the simple invasion of privacy 
interest, and the issue of narrowly tailoring a restriction on PWBC data 
publication would become determinative. A law that allowed judges to 
sanitize recordings before release using redaction, either through selective 
blurring or muting, could be a more tailored means of protecting the 
 
350 That analysis would be highly fact intensive and beyond the scope of this Comment. See 
Kreimer, supra note 179, at 393 (“[W]here legal rules constraining image capture legitimately seek to 
protect the privacy of intimate venues, analysis of the actual magnitude of the competing interests 
is required before liability can be sustained.”). 
351 565 U.S. 400, 402-04 (2012) (holding that the installation of a GPS device on a suspect’s 
vehicle is a search within the language of the Fourth Amendment); see also Shiller, supra note 3, at 
198 (noting how there is no expectation of privacy in public because persons voluntarily convey 
information to any other parties in their surroundings). 
352 Stanley, supra note 343. 
353 The chilling effect that fear of disclosure of a conversation has on private speech was 
recognized as a significant interest in preserving the ability of the public to voice “critical and 
constructive ideas.” Bartnicki v. Vopper, 532 U.S. 514, 533 (2001). 
354 See Fan, supra note 1, at 438-39 (noting that public disclosure of PWBC data presents a “risk 
of deterring victims from seeking help at all”); Jay Stanley, Why ‘Active Investigations’ Don’t Justify 
Keeping Police Video Secret, ACLU (Dec. 4, 2015) https://www.aclu.org/blog/privacy-
technology/surveillance-technologies/why-active-investigations-dont-justify-keeping-police-video-
secret [https://perma.cc/J6G5-QYNH] (“One purpose of these [active police investigation] 
exemptions is to protect people from the stigma of being under investigation before the police have 
even finished assessing whether there is evidence of their involvement in a crime.”). 
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government’s significant interest in preserving public cooperation in the 
competitive enterprise of law enforcement.355 This may qualify as a least 
restrictive, effective means of achieving the compelling interest sufficient to 
survive strict scrutiny.356 
B. Administration of Justice as a Compelling Government Interest 
The second cluster of interests a government may offer in favor of 
censoring PWBC data would be connected to the need to protect the integrity 
of ongoing investigations and potential court proceedings. PWBC data are 
often withheld by police departments from the public under exceptions to 
public records laws for ongoing investigations.357 Release of video could 
undermine investigations by tipping off potential suspects, thus making 
identifications and arrests more difficult. While sufficient to exempt video 
from public records requests, this concern carries less force when the local 
authorities themselves seek to release the video. In that situation, a police 
department would not likely seek to release the video if it threatened to 
complicate an investigation. Additionally, situations where a locality seeks to 
release video would likely be of public concern, usually involving a police use 
of force. Those incidents involve known suspects, both police personnel and 
complaining victims, so the fear of tipping off at-large suspects is lessened.358 
The government could advance a more significant and applicable interest 
in preserving the right of a fair trial for people depicted in PWBC video. If 
the release of PWBC video would “create a serious threat to the fair, 
impartial, and orderly administration of justice,” then perhaps a prior 
 
355 In fact, the ACLU recommends redaction be used for the protection of individual privacy 
when body camera data are released publicly. See Stanley, supra note 343; Stanley, supra note 354 
(“Redaction should also be sufficient should bystanders or others in a video happen to be 
informants.”). Although redaction would be a resource intensive method of narrow tailoring, the 
administrative burden of implementing a less restrictive means is not usually a sufficient defense 
under strict scrutiny. See Frontiero v. Richardson, 411 U.S. 677, 690 (1973) (“[W]hen we enter the 
realm of ‘strict judicial scrutiny,’ there can be no doubt that ‘administrative convenience’ is not a 
shibboleth, the mere recitation of which dictates constitutionality.”). 
356 See Ashcroft v. American Civil Liberties Union, 535 U.S. 564, 566 (2004) (holding that the 
Child Online Protection Act’s use of community standards to determine whether material is harmful 
to minors is not “facially unconstitutional”). 
357 See N.C. GEN. STAT. § 132-1.4A(d)(6) (2016) (authorizing the custodian to deny public 
requests “[i]f confidentiality is necessary to protect either an active or inactive internal or criminal 
investigation or potential . . . investigation”); Martin Kaste, Piecing Together America’s Patchwork Quilt 
of Body Cam Laws, NPR (Feb. 25, 2016) http://www.npr.org/sections/alltechconsidered/2016/02/25/
467990199/piecing-together-the-countrys-patchwork-quilt-of-body-cam-laws [https://perma.cc/8X
W9-ZKP7] (“Police can usually withhold videos, at least temporarily, to protect pending investigations, 
or for other ‘public safety’ reasons.”); Stanley, supra note 354. 
358 Kaste, supra note 357. 
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restraint on its release is justified.359 This claim is common in cases where 
PWBC data are withheld, and one possible aspect of the argument is that 
pre-trial release of PWBC video could taint the jury pool.360 However, the 
use of prior restraints to prevent pre-trial publicity from harming a criminal 
defendant’s right to a fair trial has been held unconstitutional by the Court. 
In Nebraska Press Ass’n v. Stuart, the Court rejected the argument that pre-
trial publicity irreparably harmed a defendant’s right to a fair trial, noting 
that there were several less restrictive means of protecting that interest than 
a prior restraint on publication.361 The Court there found that the possibility 
of securing a change in venue, postponing the trial until public awareness 
faded, using vior dire to sift through jurors, and employing clear jury 
instructions that they use only evidence presented at trial were all options 
that had not been shown to be less effective than prior restraint in preserving 
a right to a fair trial.362 A prior restraint is not a narrowly tailored means of 
preventing jury bias when parties can strike jurors or move for a change of 
venue rather than prohibit the pre-trial publicity that a release of PWBC 
video brings.363 And when such measures are sufficient to protect fair 
proceedings when bystander video is released publicly before trial, release by 
the municipality should not be treated differently. 
A proponent of a restraint could also argue more generally that public 
disclosure of video that may become evidence threatens the administration of 
justice apart from any individual right to a fair trial. However, the Court “has 
consistently rejected the argument that such [out-of-court] commentary [on 
pending cases or grand jury investigations] constitute[s] a clear and present 
danger to the administration of justice.”364 One notable exception is when 
disclosure is made by a party to the litigation concerning information received 
in discovery. In Seattle Times Co. v. Rhinehart, the Court upheld a protective 
order prohibiting a newspaper from publishing information it obtained in 
 
359 N.C. GEN. STAT. § 132-1.4A(d)(5) (2016). 
360 Alison Knezevich & Pamela Wood, Baltimore County Withholds Body Camera Footage 
Withheld in Three Police Shootings, BALTIMORE SUN (Apr. 28, 2017) http://www.baltimoresun.com
/news/maryland/crime/bs-md-co-body-cameras-20170426-story.html [https://perma.cc/28EP-CD4
Q] (reporting that a police spokeswoman stated “[r]elease [of PWBC data] could compromise the 
prosecution and the defendants’ right to fair trials”); Wootson Jr., supra note 10 (stating that in the 
case of a teenager with schizoaffective disorder charged with resisting arrest, “the district attorney’s 
office has told a judge that releasing the [PWBC] video would affect Jose Charles’s case”). 
361 427 U.S. 539, 570 (1976) (holding that while free expression rights are not an absolute bar 
to imposing prior restraints, prohibiting reporting on judicial proceedings held in public does not 
overcome that barrier). 
362 Id. at 602-03. 
363 Stanley, supra note 354. 
364 Landmark Commc’ns., Inc. v. Virginia, 435 U.S. 829, 844-45 (1978) (citing Wood v. 
Georgia, 370 U.S. 375 (1962); Craig v. Harney, 331 U.S. 367 (1947); Pennekamp v. Florida, 328 U.S. 
331 (1946); Bridges v. California, 314 U.S. 252 (1941)). 
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discovery because the confidentiality protections were directly related to 
preserving the efficacy of the discovery process, and through it, the entire 
system of litigation.365 While a municipality may be considered a participant 
in potential litigation, PWBC data are not obtained through discovery and so 
do not implicate the substantial government interest in preserving the 
efficacy of the discovery system. Since truthful reports on court proceedings 
published by third parties are protected by the First Amendment,366 a 
suggestion that potential litigants could release truthful reports on incidents 
that may become the subject of later proceedings so long as they are already 
in the possession of the reporter is not a farfetched analytical leap. PWBC 
data in the possession of a municipality fits that bill, and so the mere fact that 
it may become a piece of evidence in later litigation is not immediately 
connected to judicial proceedings in a way recognized by the Court to 
implicate administration of justice concerns. 
As restrictions on the public release of PWBC data are content-based 
prior restraints on publication, a proponent of censorship would need to 
advance a compelling government interest to which the particular restraint is 
narrowly tailored if a government speaker is protected under the First 
Amendment. Common interests advanced by police departments when 
withholding video from public record requests serve as a guide to possible 
arguments a proponent of the restraint might advance. However, a 
government interest in protecting individual privacy is narrow, and current 
laws like those of North Carolina are not well fitted to serve that interest. 
Additionally, concerns over tainted jury pools are just as effectively addressed 
through means other than prior restraint, and the integrity of judicial 
administration is rarely at issue before proceedings have even begun. While 
this is hardly a comprehensive analysis of the interests a proponent might 
advance to support a prior restraint on local government release of PWBC 
data, the rigors of strict scrutiny suggest such laws would need to be more 
narrowly tailored than they currently are to survive the gauntlet. 
 
365 467 U.S. 20, 37 (1984). 
366 See Landmark Commc’ns., 435 U.S. at 837-38 (“The narrow and limited question presented, 
then, is whether the First Amendment permits the criminal punishment of third persons who are 
strangers to the inquiry . . . for divulging or publishing truthful information regarding confidential 
proceedings . . . . The Commonwealth’s interests . . . are insufficient to justify the actual and 
potential encroachments on freedom of speech.” (citations omitted)); Nebraska Press Ass’n v. Stuart, 
427 U.S. 539, 559 (1976) (“Truthful reports of public judicial proceedings have been afforded special 
protection against subsequent punishment.”). 
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VI. A MUNICIPAL CLAIM THAT RESIDENTS HAVE A  
“RIGHT TO KNOW” 
If government speech is not protected under the First Amendment, a 
municipality could still raise an alternative claim that state laws restricting the 
release of PWBC data violate the First Amendment rights of its residents on 
the basis of a limited “right to know.” Using a municipality’s residents’ right to 
know as the constitutional basis for a municipal challenge instead of its own 
protected right to speak sidesteps the Hunter doctrine’s ban of local 
powerlessness. Because Hunter has not been substantively incorporated into the 
First Amendment,367 a state’s ability to control its political subdivision is 
constrained by the First Amendment. Further, if a state legislature’s exercise of 
control over a locality violates the individual residents’ First Amendment 
rights,368 the Court would likely permit a municipality to challenge that control 
on constitutional grounds. While the public’s right to know government 
information is an extremely limited doctrine,369 it is based in First Amendment 
interests.370 Because of its First Amendment grounding, a municipal plaintiff 
could bring such a claim within the shadow doctrine of Hunter. Given this 
possibility, this Part examines whether state laws restricting PWBC data 
disclosures violate the extremely limited First Amendment right to know. 
This Part first explores the limited scope of the right to know, concluding 
that while the public’s interest in gathering certain kinds of government 
information has been decisive in determining some First Amendment claims, 
it is extremely narrow. Second, it examines what remains of the right to know 
government information after Los Angeles Police Department v. United Reported 
Publishing Corp.371 and concludes there is very little support for the right 
beyond protecting physical access to vital government facilities. Finally, it 
distinguishes the posture of United Reporting from this Comment’s 
 
367 See supra Part I (discussing how Gomillion limited Hunter to the substantive provisions it addressed). 
368 Such a First Amendment claim would be similar to the Equal Protection challenge upheld 
in Romer v. Evans or the Fifteenth Amendment challenge upheld in Gomillion v. Lightfoot. 
369 See Houchins v. KQED, Inc., 438 U.S. 1, 9 (1978) (“This Court has never intimated a First 
Amendment guarantee of a right of access to all sources of information within government 
control.”); Pell v. Procunier, 417 U.S. 817, 834 (1974) (“Newsmen have no constitutional right of 
access to the scenes of crime or disaster when the general public is excluded.” (citing Branzburg v. 
Hayes, 408 U.S. 665, 684-85 (1972))); Developments in the Law—The Law of Media, 120 HARV. L. 
REV. 1019, 1029 (2007) (“It remains—and should remain—the case that there is no constitutional 
right of access to government information.”). 
370 See Globe Newspaper Co. v. Superior Court for Norfolk Cty., 457 U.S. 596, 604 (1982) 
(“Underlying the First Amendment right of access to criminal trials is the common understanding that a 
‘major purpose of that Amendment was to protect the free discussion of governmental affairs’ . . . . By 
offering such protection, the First Amendment serves to ensure that the individual citizen can effectively 
participate in and contribute to our republican system of self-government.” (citation omitted)). 
371 528 U.S. 32 (1999). 
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hypothetical First Amendment claim by a municipal plaintiff to conclude that 
a content-based restriction of government information burdens protected 
speech and must be backed by a justification sufficient to survive heightened 
judicial scrutiny. 
A. The Scope of the Right to Know 
The Court has not explicitly recognized a constitutional right to know 
based in the First Amendment.372 Despite this, Justices have framed a vast 
number of First Amendment decisions in terms that suggest the public’s 
interest in receiving information is a guiding force behind speech protections. 
In Board of Education Island Trees Union Free School District No 26 v. Pico, the 
Court acknowledged “the right to receive ideas is a necessary predicate to the 
recipient’s meaningful exercise of his own rights of speech, press, and political 
freedom.”373 And in Virginia State Board of Pharmacy v. Virginia Citizens 
Consumer Council, the Court stated it “has referred to a First Amendment 
right to ‘receive information and ideas,’ and that freedom of speech 
‘necessarily protects the right to receive.’”374 Passages like these375 prompted 
a horde of legal scholars to suggest a right to know is a part of the First 
Amendment freedom of speech.376 
The strongest support for a right to know government information comes 
from cases ensuring the public’s right of access to criminal trials. Because the 
government controls these proceedings and the Court has recognized that 
open access is necessary to ensure the public’s “‘discussion of governmental 
affairs’ is an informed one,” a right to know this information has been based 
in the First Amendment.377 In Richmond Newspapers Inc. v. Virginia, the Court 
stated broadly that “an arbitrary interference with access to important 
information is an abridgment of the freedoms of speech and of the press 
 
372 See YUDOF, supra note 113, at 249 (“The Supreme Court has not expressly recognized a 
broad individual right to gather information from an unwilling government entity.”). 
373 457 U.S. 853, 867 (1982). 
374 425 U.S. 748, 757 (1976) (quoting Kleindienst v. Mandel, 408 U.S. 753, 762-63 (1972)). 
375 See also Red Lion Broad. Co. v. Fed. Commc’ns Comm’n, 395 U.S. 367, 390 (1969) (“It is 
the right of the public to receive suitable access to social, political, esthetic, moral, and other ideas 
and experiences.”); YUDOF, supra note 113, at 201 (stating the Court struck down a restriction of 
corporate speech in Bellotti “in part because of the impact the law’s restraints would have on 
information flows to and among citizens”). 
376 See Thomas I. Emerson, Legal Foundations of the Right to Know, 1976 WASH. U. L.Q. 1, 2 
(asserting that the “right to know” falls within First Amendment protection of freedom of 
expression); Meredith Fuchs, Judging Secrets: The Role Courts Should Play in Preventing Unnecessary 
Secrecy, 58 ADMIN. L. REV. 131, 140 n.40 (2006) (tracing the arguments of scholars who have written 
in support “of a constitutional right to know information about the government”). 
377 Globe Newspaper Co. v. Superior Court for Norfolk Cty., 457 U.S. 596, 604-05 (1982) 
(citing Mills v. Alabama, 384 U.S. 214, 218 (1966)) (recognizing a presumptive public right of access 
to criminal trials). 
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protected by the First Amendment.”378 And in Globe Newspaper Co. v. Superior 
Court for Norfolk County, the Court explicitly acknowledged that the First 
Amendment right of access recognizes “a major purpose of that Amendment 
was to protect the free discussion of governmental affairs . . . [b]y offering 
such protection, the First Amendment serves to ensure that the individual 
citizen can effectively participate in and contribute to our republican system 
of self-government.”379 Criminal trials are therefore open to the public under 
the First Amendment free speech guarantee.380 
B. The Right to Know After United Reporting 
Despite the sweeping language of Richmond Newspapers and its progeny, 
the Court has not extended the public’s right of access beyond the context of 
criminal trials.381 There is no right to know all governmental information 
based on the Richmond Newspapers rationale,382 despite the fact that such a 
right “fits readily into the first amendment”383 as a “natural complement to 
the right to speak.”384 Attempts to expand the right of access into a general 
right to know met a firm wall in Los Angeles Police Department v. United 
Reporting Publishing Corp.385 In United Reporting, the Court denied a facial 
 
378 448 U.S. 555, 583 (1980) (Stevens, J., concurring). 
379 Globe Newspaper, 457 U.S. at 604 (citing Mills v. Alabama, 384 U.S. 214, 218 (1966)). 
380 See Richmond Newspapers, 448 U.S. at 580 (holding that “the right to attend criminal trials is 
implicit in the guarantees of the First Amendment, without the freedom to attend such trials . . . important 
aspects of freedom of speech and ’of the press could be eviscerated” (citing Branzburg v. Hayes, 408 U.S. 
665, 681 (1972))); see also Press-Enterprise Co. v. Superior Court of Cal., 478 U.S. 1, 10 (1986) (“The 
considerations that led the Court to apply the First Amendment right of access to criminal trials 
in Richmond Newspapers and Globe and the selection of jurors in Press-Enterprise I lead us to conclude that 
the right of access applies to preliminary hearings as conducted in California.”). 
381 As Seth Kreimer notes, the Court “has rejected an unadorned First Amendment ‘right to 
gather information’ that supersedes other legal obligations.” Kreimer, supra note 179, at 387; see also 
Note, The Rights of the Public and the Press to Gather Information, supra note 196, at 1512 (noting the 
Court has not “recognized an affirmative constitutional obligation to disclose”); id. at 1525 (“[T]he 
public and press have no constitutional right to force information about even important public 
matters from an unwilling government or other source.”). 
382 The Court has determined that the Constitution does not guarantee access to government-
held information which is accessible through FOIA requests. See McBurney v. Young, 133 S. Ct. 
1709, 1718 (2013) (“This Court has repeatedly made clear that there is no constitutional right to 
obtain all the information provided by FOIA laws . . . ‘The Constitution itself is [not] a Freedom 
of Information Act.’” (quoting Houchins v. KQED, Inc., 438 U.S. 1, 14 (1978))). 
383 Emerson, supra note 376, at 2. 
384 Vincent Blasi, The Pathological Perspective and the First Amendment, 85 COLUM. L. REV. 449, 
489 (1985); see also Emerson, supra note 376, at 14 (“[T]he constitutional right to know embraces the 
right of the public to obtain information from the government. There is a firm, indeed 
overwhelming, theoretical base for accepting this position.”). 
385 See 528 U.S. 32, 41 (1999) (denying a facial overbreadth challenge to a state statute 
restricting access to arrestee addresses collected by the police department to those seeking it for 
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overbreadth challenge to a statute restricting access to arrestee addresses 
collected by the police department. The Court held that because the law did 
not impose a threat of prosecution on speakers, the justification for 
overbreadth challenges—that protected speech would be chilled and standing 
never obtained to challenge the law—was not present and the doctrine should 
not be employed.386 The Court explained that the statute “is not an 
abridgment of anyone’s right to engage in speech . . . but simply a law 
regulating access to information in the hands of the police department.”387 In 
denying the overbreadth challenge, the Court stated “California could decide 
not to give out arrestee information at all without violating the First 
Amendment.”388 
C. United Reporting Distinguished 
In distinguishing United Reporting from this Comment’s hypothetical right 
to know claim, it must first be noted that United Reporting was a refusal to 
apply the overbreadth doctrine. As the Court itself explained in the 
subsequent case of Sorrell v. IMS Health, the United Reporting Court “did not 
rule on the merits of any First Amendment claim.”389 Instead, the 
overbreadth doctrine, a doctrine applied sparingly to begin with because it is 
“strong medicine,”390 was not employed because the concern that protected 
speech would be chilled was not present.391 Since no First Amendment claim 
was actually decided in United Reporting, the statement that all information 
could be withheld without implicating the First Amendment is dicta, albeit 
strong and well-supported dicta.392 This leaves open the possibility to argue 
that a right to know government-held information may exist. Notably, such a 
right cannot be argued to be strong enough, after United Reporting, to sustain 
 
academic or political purposes because the law could be applied constitutionally to bar access by 
petitioner commercial business which sold such information). 
386 See id. at 38-41. The Court did note that overbreadth challenges had been decided by the 
Court in the absence of the threat of actual prosecution, but ultimately held this case did not present 
such a situation. Id. at 39. 
387 Id. at 40. 
388 Id. (emphasis added). 
389 564 U.S. 552, 568 (2011). 
390 United Reporting, 528 U.S. at 39. 
391 See id. at 40 (“To the extent that respondent’s ‘facial challenge’ seeks to rely on the effect 
of the statute on parties not before the Court . . . its claim does not fit within the case law allowing 
courts to entertain facial challenges . . . ‘because there is [no] possibility that protected speech will 
be muted.’” (citations omitted)). 
392 Justice Breyer noted in dissent that while it may be dicta, it is dicta that was not contradicted in 
all of the Court’s prior case law. See Sorrell v. IMS Health Inc., 564 U.S. 552, 588 (2011) (Breyer, J., 
dissenting) (“[T]his Court has never found that the First Amendment prohibits the government from 
restricting the use of information gathered pursuant to a regulatory mandate-whether the information 
rests in government files or has remained in the hands of the private firms that gathered it.”). 
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an overbreadth challenge because violating a right to know is not imposing a 
penalty on a speech activity itself; instead, it is merely barring access to the 
necessary ingredients for speech. A municipal claim that PWBC data 
restrictions burden the speech of the public that would seek to use that 
information for speech activities of their own does not face the hurdle of an 
overbreadth challenge, and is on that ground distinguished from United 
Reporting.393 Such a claim would be an as-applied challenge because the 
municipality would argue speech is actually abridged by denying access to 
this information, not that protected speech could be abridged by the 
application of these restrictions. 
While there may not as of yet be a right to know government information 
and such a right is unlikely to be recognized given the dicta of United 
Reporting, it is important to note that a majority of the Court recognized that 
denial of access to government information can violate the First Amendment. 
In Sorrell, the Court recognized that eight Justices in United Reporting 
endorsed the proposition that “restrictions on the disclosure of government-
held information can facilitate or burden the expression of potential 
recipients and thereby transgress the First Amendment.”394 In the more 
recent case of Packingham v. North Carolina, Justice Kennedy signaled the 
importance of preserving access to ideas and discourse under the First 
Amendment.395 In striking down a law prohibiting sex offenders from 
accessing any website where they might interact with a child, the Court noted 
foreclosing access to social media would “prevent the user from engaging in 
the legitimate exercise of First Amendment rights,” going on to suggest 
constitutional harm might be imposed on convicted criminals if they are 
denied the ability to “receive legitimate benefits from these means for access 
to the world of ideas.”396 If the right of access noted in Sorrel, and hinted at 
in Packingham, is a protected First Amendment interest, the government must 
justify the burden its restriction of PWBC data places on the speech activities 
 
393 Just as the Court noted in Sorrell when, in examining United Reporting, it stated “the [United 
Reporting] Court assumed that the plaintiff had not suffered a personal First Amendment injury and 
could prevail only by invoking the rights of others through a facial challenge.” Id. at 569. A municipal 
claim raising violations of residents’ rights under Gomillion is not an invocation of the rights of 
others akin to an overbreadth challenge, so it is not stymied by this bar. 
394 Id. The Court in Sorrell cited Justice Scalia’s concurrence, which stated “a restriction upon 
access that allows access to the press . . ., but at the same time denies access to persons who wish to 
use the information for certain speech purposes, is in reality a restriction upon speech.” Id. (Scalia, 
J., dissenting). The Court also cited Justice Ginsburg, who stated in concurrence that “the provision 
of [government] information is a kind of subsidy to people who wish to speak” on certain topics. Id. 
(Ginsburg, J., dissenting). 
395 137 S. Ct. 1730, 1737 (2017) (“[T]he statute here enacts a prohibition unprecedented in the 
scope of the First Amendment speech it burdens.”). 
396 Id. 
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of those municipal residents who wish to receive it. Such a constitutional 
claim would have to be based on the burden restricted access to government-
held information places on protected First Amendment speech activities in 
order to avoid running afoul of precedent which states there is no “right of 
access to all sources of information within government control.”397 This 
narrow approach of claiming a burden upon First Amendment activity would 
be extremely limited, but perhaps possible. 
Justice Stevens, dissenting in United Reporting, proposed just such a 
burden of proof for government restrictions in that case on the basis that “the 
State’s discrimination is based on its desire to prevent the information from 
being used for constitutionally protected purposes.”398 This suggests the 
purpose of denying access to government information matters and an 
insufficient justification may not sustain an access restriction. While this 
counsels only the application of a balancing of interests test rather than an 
absolute right to know government information, when the access restriction 
is content or speaker-based heightened judicial scrutiny will require 
something more than a rational basis to justify the law.399 The burden placed 
on free expression by restricting access to PWBC data requires constitutional 
review under heightened scrutiny when the restriction discriminates based 
on topic or speaker. State laws that specifically single out the release of 
PWBC data for restriction seem to be content-based as they do not restrict 
the release of other types of video that government actors generate. If so, 
heightened scrutiny should apply to these laws when challenged by a 
municipality on behalf of its residents, and the analysis would likely feature 
arguments similar to those presented in Part V. 
CONCLUSION 
Police-worn body camera video is a powerful tool. When disclosed to the 
public by local authorities, it can create transparency in highly charged 
situations when it is much needed, it can provide the raw data necessary for 
the informed exercise of self-government, and it can demonstrate an 
understanding that partnership between police departments and the 
community is essential. State laws that prevent local governments from 
granting these benefits to their residents could be challenged by those local 
 
397 Houchins v. KQED, Inc. 438 U.S. 1, 9 (1978). 
398 Los Angeles Police Dep’t v. United Reporting Pub. Corp., 528 U.S. 32, 46 (1999); see also 
id. at 43 (Ginsburg, J., concurring) (“[O]nce a State decides to make [information] available to the 
public, there are no doubt limits to its freedom to decide how that benefit will be distributed.”). 
399 See Sorrell, 564 U.S. at 569-70 (“Vermont’s law imposes a content- and speaker-based 
burden on respondents’ own speech. That consideration provides a separate basis for 
distinguishing United Reporting and requires heightened judicial scrutiny.”). 
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governments if disclosure of PWBC data is recognized as a protected First 
Amendment speech activity. Should Hunter be recognized by the Court as a 
doctrine of substantive constitutional law, limited to the provisions it 
addressed, and not extending to the First Amendment as Ysursa may or may 
not indicate, the local governments could bring a First Amendment challenge 
against state laws preventing the release of PWBC data without a court order. 
Such a prior restraint based on the content of government speech would likely 
not satisfy strict scrutiny, though such an analysis would be heavily fact-
intensive and depend largely on how the law was tailored to interests of 
individual privacy and the need to provide for efficient policing. While a 
“right to know” claim offers slim alternative grounds if government speech is 
not protected under the First Amendment, the dicta of United Reporting 
presents a stiff obstacle to a municipal claim on behalf of residents in the vein 
of Gomillion. This Comment has offered one possible constitutional 
foundation for securing the transparency benefits body camera programs were 
meant to secure. Public disclosure is essential for those programs to live up 
to their promise of improving police forces and their interactions with society, 
whether through a protected government speaker or a right to know claim. 
 
